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THE UNBEARABLE EMPTINESS OF FORMALISM:
AUTONOMY, EQUALITY, AND THE FUTURE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION*
RACHEL F. MORAN**
Debates over affirmative action in higher education generally focus on equality
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment but ignore liberty interests under the
First Amendment. That tendency persists, even though the academic freedom to
enroll a diverse student body has allowed colleges and universities to defend
race-conscious admissions programs against legal challenges for decades. Today,
the rise of formalism in judicial interpretation poses new perils for these
programs. Justice Powell’s seminal decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke was a pragmatic compromise that used diversity to temper
the polarized debate over equality that sharply divided the Court. In contrast to
Justice Powell’s emphasis on the unique nature of higher education, formalist
approaches rely on the plain meaning of a statute or constitutional provision.
Shorn of context and values, textual interpretation leaves the Justices susceptible
to risks of false equivalencies and missed analogies. False equivalencies treat
categories as the same when they are in fact different, while missed analogies
treat categories as different when they are the same.
Both dangers can infect affirmative action jurisprudence. Under the First
Amendment, the Justices have failed to recognize the importance of both
sectarian organizations and institutions of higher education in preserving the
conditions for robust discourse. As a result, the Court has grown increasingly
deferential to religious freedom but more skeptical of the autonomy of colleges
and universities to weigh race in admissions. That missed analogy in turn is
compounded by a false equivalency, one that inheres in formal colorblindness.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Justices have treated all considerations
of race as similarly pernicious, equating acts that discriminate against
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historically underrepresented groups with those that seek to include them. Taken
together, declining deference for colleges and universities and an entrenched
commitment to a colorblind Constitution could spell the end for affirmative
action. Despite these failings of formalism, however, I will show that these
programs can still survive exacting judicial scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION
In the public imagination, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions about
affirmative action in higher education are all about racial equality.1 As a result,
the debate naturally focuses on the propriety of the Court’s commitment to
colorblind government decision-making under the Fourteenth Amendment.2
1. Rachel F. Moran, Bakke’s Lasting Legacy: Redefining the Landscape of Equality and Liberty in
Civil Rights Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2569, 2571, 2598–99, 2602–08 (2019).
2. This debate has persisted unabated for decades. See, e.g., David Strauss, The Myth of
Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 99–100, 114–15 (arguing that colorblindness is unattainable
because race is a relevant characteristic); John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An
Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 316–24 (1994) (critiquing
colorblindness as an evasion of “racial history and the current racial disparities in society”); Kimberlé
W. Crenshaw, Framing Affirmative Action, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 123, 125–27 (2006)
(criticizing the ideology of colorblindness as thwarting goals of promoting access and equality).
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The critiques come from two directions. For some, the Justices have strayed
from their principles by permitting race to be one factor in a holistic admissions
process based on a nebulous conception of diversity.3 For others, the Justices
have fallen short because they restrict the use of affirmative action to combat
ongoing racial subordination, instead relying on the far less convincing notion
of promoting diversity.4 Whatever the ideological perspective, then, the
emphasis is on the central importance of equal treatment, and diversity is either
a thinly camouflaged or watered-down rationale.
Given these preoccupations, it should come as no surprise that
commentators have largely neglected diversity’s roots in a First Amendment
concept of academic freedom.5 Even so, that liberty interest has kept race-based
decision-making intact in colleges and universities, even as the Court struck
down affirmative action in government employment, licensing, and
contracting.6 For that reason alone, the principle of academic freedom deserves
more attention than it has received. Recent jurisprudential developments
reinforce the urgency of evaluating this liberty interest with care. The Justices
have been steadily bolstering the institutional autonomy of other corporate
actors, particularly with respect to religious liberties.7 Yet, there has been little
consideration of whether this muscular approach to the First Amendment has
implications for affirmative action in higher education. That inattention is
especially unfortunate because the Free Exercise Clause is increasingly being
used as a shield against enforcement of nondiscrimination mandates.
To remedy that neglect, this Article explores how affirmative action in
higher education came to be framed as a dispute over institutional autonomy as
well as equality, how the rise of formalism in judicial interpretation poses new
challenges to that framework, and how the constitutionality of these programs
can nonetheless be preserved. In Part I, I look at how the Court transformed a
dispute over the role of race and equal protection in higher education into a case
3. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2220, 2222–24 (2016) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Adalberto Aguirre, Jr. & Ruben Martinez, The Diversity Rationale in Higher Education:
An Overview of the Contemporary Legal Context, 30 SOC. JUST. 138, 149 (2003) (“Remedying the effects
of past discrimination is the nexus for discussing diversity and affirmative action initiatives in higher
education.”); Theodore R. Johnson, How Conservatives Turned the ‘Color-Blind Constitution’ Against
Racial Progress, ATLANTIC (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/color
blind-constitution/602221/ [https://perma.cc/DBM2-723M (dark archive)].
5. Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 464–66 (2005) [hereinafter
Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment].
6. Moran, supra note 1, at 2571, 2608–09.
7. See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020); Little
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). See generally Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment
Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 115–24 (2009) [hereinafter
Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions] (arguing that churches should enjoy substantial
autonomy in a separate sphere of sovereignty).
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about academic freedom and the First Amendment. As I will show, the Court
was fully cognizant that this jurisprudential move had implications for other
areas of the law, most notably corporate free speech rights.8 In fact, the embrace
of institutional autonomy was deliberate, permitting affirmative action
programs to survive while bolstering liberty claims by other organizations. Ever
since, the programs’ legitimacy has turned on deference to academic
administrators’ freedom to enroll a diverse student body, even if they must
consider race to do so. That pragmatic compromise between liberty and equality
interests lies at the heart of the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.
In Part II, I turn to the powerful challenges that the rise of formalism
poses to this diversity framework. Constitutional law scholar Cass R. Sunstein
has already predicted that the Court’s formalist approach will sound the death
knell for race-conscious admissions programs. He believes that because the
Justices increasingly “emphasize[] the text, not the intentions” when evaluating
nondiscrimination provisions, “affirmative action programs are doomed,
because they plainly discriminate because of race.”9 In response to this gloomy
forecast, I carefully analyze formalism’s implications for institutional autonomy
under the First Amendment and racial equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As I demonstrate, in both doctrinal areas, the Court has had
jurisprudential blind spots that arise when the Justices rely on narrow factual
analogies and ignore the values that animate core constitutional protections. In
some instances, the Court has used false equivalencies that treat categories as
the same when they are in truth different. The most commonplace example is
a refusal to distinguish between the racial subordination of non-Whites and
reverse discrimination against Whites. In other cases, the Court has missed
analogies by treating categories as different when they actually are the same.
The most prominent instance is the Court’s increasing skepticism of academic
autonomy and growing deference to religious organizations, even when both
play a critical part in advancing the expression and exchange of ideas.
In Part III, after exploring formalism’s failings under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, I consider how scholars and advocates can use this
analysis to preserve affirmative action in higher education. For example, the
Court has been increasingly willing to challenge the pedagogical expertise of
colleges and universities, a stance that contrasts markedly with the highly
deferential treatment that religious organizations receive.10 It is essential to
8. Moran, supra note 1, at 2591–94.
9. Cass R. Sunstein, Gorsuch Paves Way for End of Affirmative Action, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June
17, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/opinion-gorsuch-paves-way-for-end-of-affirm
ative-action-cass-sunstein [https://perma.cc/PP7H-8X4R (dark archive)].
10. Compare Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 297–99 (2013), with Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 683–85 (demonstrating the Court’s deferential treatment of religious
organizations).
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identify this as a missed analogy that diminishes claims to self-determination in
higher education, particularly when it comes to race, diversity, and the learning
process. At the same time, the danger to affirmative action is heightened
because in cases bolstering the autonomy of religious organizations, the Court
has made clear that racial discrimination is sui generis and highly invidious,
triggering the most searching scrutiny.11 Indeed, racial discrimination is so
pernicious that even religious liberty claims typically cannot overcome the need
to eradicate it. Those decisions make it more likely that the consideration of
race in higher education will be deemed a wrong that academic freedom, a
comparatively weaker autonomy claim, cannot countermand. That result will
be justified by a false equivalency, one that treats programs designed to level
the playing field as fungible with actions designed to exclude racial minorities.
If the failings of formalism are left unaddressed, this approach to judicial
interpretation could deliver a double whammy: the missed analogy that weakens
academic freedom will combine with the false equivalency of racial
classifications to deal a fatal blow to affirmative action. However, this outcome
is not inevitable. As I explain, the Court has long recognized distinctions
between invidious uses of race to exclude students from a college program and
pedagogical uses to diversify the student body. Those invidious uses of race
resemble the discrimination that the Court has gone out of its way to condemn
in religious liberty cases. So long as academic freedom remains a
constitutionally protected interest, however, there is no reason to strike down
affirmative action as a pedagogical strategy simply because the Court is
revisiting the right of religious institutions to discriminate.
I. BAKKE’S LAW: THE FIRST AMENDMENT MEETS EQUAL PROTECTION
To appreciate the perils that formalism creates for affirmative action in
higher education, it is essential to explore the roots of the diversity rationale
first set forth in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.12 That decision
made the First Amendment interest in academic freedom a critical bulwark
against attacks on the use of race in admissions. Recognition of this interest
enabled college and university administrators to enroll a diverse student body,
even if this meant deviating from a strict principle of colorblindness. Over the
years, the Court has continued to embrace this deferential approach and deepen
its understanding of the underlying purposes of diversity. Recently, however,

11. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 733; see also James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution
of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex
Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 120–21 (2015) (noting that scholars emphasize “the singular
place of racial discrimination in American history” to deny protection from religious exemptions to
gays and lesbians).
12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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the Justices have expressed increasing doubt about administrators’ discretionary
judgments, and attacks on affirmative action in admissions persist unabated.
A.

Bakke and the Origins of the Diversity Rationale

Issues of racial equality dominate today’s debates about affirmative action
in higher education. That framework is hardly surprising, given that the
litigation leading up to the Court’s pathbreaking decision in Bakke focused on
permissible uses of race in admissions under Title VI and the Equal Protection
Clause.13 Despite that preoccupation with equality, Justice Lewis Powell’s
pivotal opinion ultimately relied on an institutional autonomy interest under
the First Amendment—academic freedom—to preserve some role for race in
composing a student body.14 To understand contemporary challenges to
affirmative action, it is imperative to understand how interests in liberty and
equality have intersected in Bakke and later Supreme Court decisions.
When the newly created medical school at the University of California at
Davis rejected Allan Bakke’s application, he framed his lawsuit wholly in terms
of race.15 U.C. Davis had a special admissions program that set aside sixteen
percent of the seats in the entering class for students from disadvantaged
backgrounds.16 As Bakke alleged in his complaint, he “was duly qualified for
admission to Medical School and the sole reason his application was rejected
was on account of his race, to-wit, Caucasian or white, and not for reasons
applicable to persons of every race.”17 The lower courts accepted this framing.
A California superior court judge struck down the special admissions program
as a form of impermissible racial discrimination but doubted whether the
medical school would have admitted Bakke even in the absence of the setaside.18 The California Supreme Court affirmed in a five-to-one decision,
finding that the program’s goals were laudable but that the “overemphasis on
race”19 produced divisive harms that outweighed any societal benefits. As Justice
Stanley Mosk wrote for the majority, “the principle that the Constitution
sanctions racial discrimination against a race—any race—is a dangerous concept
fraught with potential for misuse in situations which involve far less laudable

13. See id. at 270–72.
14. See id. at 312.
15. Complaint for Mandatory Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 2–3, Bakke v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., No. 31287 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1974) (describing “separate segregated admissions procedures
with separate standards for admissions,” which “resulted in the admission of minority applicants less
qualified than plaintiff and other non-minority applicants who were therefore rejected”).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (describing lower court opinion).
19. Id. at 1171–72.
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objectives than are manifest in the present case.”20 Even the lone dissenter,
Justice Matthew Tobriner, understood the litigation as centrally about race.
Emphasizing the nation’s long history of segregation, he considered U.C.
Davis’s affirmative action program a modest and constitutionally permissible
effort to integrate predominantly White colleges and universities.21
Nothing in the lower court decisions suggested that Bakke’s lawsuit would
be transformed into a First Amendment case before the U.S. Supreme Court.22
Nor did the briefs submitted by the parties and amici fundamentally alter the
perception that, at its core,23 the litigation was about racial equality.24 Out of
the many amicus briefs filed, only two—both submitted by colleges and
universities—mentioned diversity as an important pedagogical objective that
required leeway to experiment with different approaches to voluntarily
integrating the student body.25 At oral argument, Archibald Cox, a former
Solicitor General and Harvard Law School professor, argued on behalf of the
University of California that diversity was one of several compelling interests
served by the special admissions program.26 However, the University offered
three other objectives focused on equality concerns: rectifying the
underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities in the medical profession,
enhancing the availability of doctors to serve minority communities, and
compensating for past societal discrimination.27 As a result, diversity—with its
emphasis on the learning process at the medical school—was something of an
outlier among the program’s stated aims. The medical school’s other goals
primarily targeted changes in the larger society, mostly in the world of
medicine, to overcome patterns of racial exclusion.
So, it undoubtedly came as something of a surprise that the pivotal opinion
in the case, written by Justice Powell, conceptualized the lawsuit in terms of

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 1191 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
Moran, supra note 1, at 2581.
Oral Argument of Archibald Cox, Esq., on Behalf of the Petitioner, in 100 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1977 TERM SUPPLEMENT 628–29 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1978).
24. See William Claiborne, 57 Law Briefs on Bakke, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 1977), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/09/17/57-law-briefs-on-bakke/b3cb7c7c-b70e-4008-ad
c1-964886cbd552/ [https://perma.cc/VL5M-CR9X (dark archive)] (describing the large number of
briefs filed in the Bakke litigation and noting that they focused heavily on remedies for discrimination
and dangers of reverse discrimination).
25. Brief of Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University & the University of
Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae at 12, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No.
76-811), 1976 WL 181278, at *12; Brief of the State of Washington & the University of Washington as
Amicus Curiae at 27, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1976 WL 178775, at *27.
26. Oral Argument of Archibald Cox, Esq., on Behalf of the Petitioner, supra note 23, at 628–29.
27. Id. at 623, 628–29, 632, 637–38.
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academic freedom for colleges and universities under the First Amendment.28
His opinion became decisive because it navigated between his colleagues’
polarized positions on racial equality. While four Justices would have prohibited
voluntary affirmative action in admissions as unlawful reverse discrimination,
four others were willing to accept U.C. Davis’s program as a permissible way to
redress societal inequality, including exclusion from the medical profession.29
Justice Powell was loath to adopt either view, so he set about finding a middle
way. That turned out to be a diversity rationale rooted in institutional
autonomy. In particular, he invoked academic freedom as a justification for
deferring to university officials’ decisions about how to compose the student
body.30
Not only did Justice Powell have to tread carefully given his colleagues’
fundamentally irreconcilable positions on racial equality, he also had to make
certain that his opinion bolstered, rather than undermined, earlier decisions
protecting corporate speech from government regulation.31 During the Court’s
deliberations on Bakke’s case, Justice William Rehnquist circulated a
memorandum contrasting the medical school’s arguments with those in Buckley
v. Valeo,32 a case that rejected campaign finance limits imposed on individuals,
partnerships, committees, associations, corporations, and other organizations.33
Congress had adopted the restrictions to reduce unfair advantages in
influencing electoral politics, but the Justices concluded that the law
impermissibly “restrict[ed] the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others,” a concept that was “wholly foreign to
the First Amendment.”34 Justice Rehnquist saw U.C. Davis’s affirmative action
program as similarly problematic because it sacrificed Bakke’s liberty interest—

28. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Lewis F. Powell (Nov. 22, 1977), in BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 195, 217–23
(1988).
29. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324–26, 336–49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 412–18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Moran, supra note 1, at 2597;
Adam Harris, The Supreme Court Justice Who Forever Changed Affirmative Action, ATLANTIC (Oct. 13,
2018), http//theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/10/how-lewis-powell-changed-affirmative-action
/572938 [https://perma.cc/WWG6-5PZV (dark archive)] (noting that the four-to-four split on the
Court allowed Powell to “upend[] the dominant view of the time,” which focused on remediation).
30. See Moran, supra note 1, at 2594–95, 2597. For a critique of Powell’s “revisionist view of
institutional academic freedom” as a rationale “for that day and trip only,” see Mark G. Yudof, Three
Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831, 855–56 (1987).
31. Moran, supra note 1, at 2591–94.
32. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), superseded in part by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540
U.S. 93 (2003).
33. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice William H. Rehnquist (Nov. 10, 1977), in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, at 192.
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
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that is, his right to compete for a seat in the entering class—to promote the
equality interests of others.35
Justice Rehnquist’s observations surely got Justice Powell’s attention. As
a principal architect of the Buckley decision, Justice Powell considered the
opinion central to his longstanding commitment to empower businesses to play
a prominent role in politics.36 He had to find a way to embrace the diversity
rationale without casting doubt on the emerging corporate free speech doctrine.
For the strategy to work, Justice Powell needed to make clear that diversity was
not a means to level the playing field by redressing racial disadvantage. For that
reason, he rejected all of U.C. Davis’s objectives related to rectifying inequities
in the medical profession and in society in general. Instead, Justice Powell
focused on academic freedom and the role that colleges and universities play in
promoting the robust exchange of ideas.37 This shift allowed him to characterize
special admissions programs as tools to advance a better learning environment
for all students, rather than as a means to compensate for past discrimination.
By focusing on institutional autonomy rather than racial redress, Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke was consistent with Buckley, even as it found a way to
preserve some use of race in higher education admissions.38 That said, his
deference to colleges and universities was still cabined. Even after substantially
narrowing the mission of affirmative action programs, he continued to express
considerable reservations about racial classifications as well as the dangers of
reverse discrimination against applicants like Bakke.39 As a result, Justice Powell
imposed strict scrutiny on affirmative action programs.40 Under this heightened
standard of review, U.C. Davis’s program had to be necessary to promote the
medical school’s compelling interest in diversity.41 The program did not pass
muster because its set-aside needlessly rigidified racial categories and
segregated the admissions process.42

93.

35. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice William H. Rehnquist, supra note 33, at 192–
36. The Powell Memo (AKA the Powell Manifesto), RECLAIM DEMOCRACY, http://reclaim
democracy.org/powell_memo_lewis/ [https://perma.cc/EX2W-CFJE]; see also Richard L. Hasen, The
Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION L.J. 241, 243 (2003). See generally ADAM
WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS
283–89 (2018) (describing the origins of the Powell memorandum).
37. Moran, supra note 1, at 2593–94. In this respect, Powell was not especially deferential to
colleges and universities, in part because he defined academic freedom to apply narrowly to their
teaching function. See Paul Horwitz, Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust, 59 LOY. L. REV. 489, 498–
509 (2013) [hereinafter Horwitz, Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust] (contrasting broad and narrow
judicial views of the missions of colleges and universities).
38. See Moran, supra note 1, at 2593–94.
39. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 285, 289–99 (1978).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 305–06, 314–15.
42. Id. at 315–19.
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In order to preserve a place for race while rejecting quotas, Justice Powell
offered a constitutionally viable alternative: the program of undergraduate
admissions at Harvard College.43 That program weighed race as one factor in
the holistic review of a prospective student’s file.44 Harvard’s approach allowed
each applicant to compete as an individual with every other applicant in the
pool by using a wide range of criteria, of which race was just one.45 Justice
Powell’s disposition of the case combined deference with distrust. He could
respect the medical school’s mission and goals after carefully circumscribing
them, and he could aggressively police the use of race in admissions—even when
programs promoted the exchange of ideas so central to academic freedom.
B.

Post-Bakke Decisions and the Development of the Diversity Rationale

Later Supreme Court decisions embraced Justice Powell’s compromise
and built upon it. In Grutter v. Bollinger,46 a lawsuit challenging affirmative
action at the University of Michigan’s law school, a majority of the Court
endorsed diversity as a compelling interest.47 This was an important
development because critics, including some lower-court federal judges, had
cast doubt on the vitality of the rationale, noting that Justice Powell wrote only
for himself and no other Justice joined his opinion in Bakke.48 Grutter expanded
on Bakke, which had narrowly focused on diversity’s role in the learning process
and the exchange of ideas on campus. Now, the Justices deferred to a new goal:
Michigan’s promotion of democratic legitimacy through inclusive pathways to
leadership at a highly selective institution.49 Expressing a high regard for the
law school’s autonomy, the Court rejected the dissent’s demands that Michigan
choose between preserving its elite status and enrolling a diverse student body.50
The majority concluded that academic freedom allowed Michigan to maintain
its identity as a top law school by combining a selective admissions process with
inclusive racial policies.51 The Court then applied strict scrutiny to the means
that Michigan used to achieve these goals.52 Because the law school’s program
relied on holistic review and eschewed racial quotas, the Court upheld it.53

43. Id. at 316–19.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
47. See id. at 328–33.
48. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944–45 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing Powell’s lonely opinion
in Bakke and rejecting it as binding precedent), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
49. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–33.
50. See id. at 339.
51. See id. at 340.
52. See id. at 326.
53. Id. at 334–43.
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Later, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I),54 a case challenging
affirmative action in undergraduate admissions at the University of Texas at
Austin, the Court initially appeared to be recalibrating its approach to reviewing
the use of race in admissions. In Fisher I, the Justices continued to express
considerable deference when evaluating the University’s goal of diversity, but
appeared to adopt a more skeptical stance when scrutinizing the permissibility
of race-conscious means.55 Most notably, Fisher I criticized the lower federal
courts’ use of a “good faith” test to assess whether the University properly
determined that it needed to consider race to generate a diverse student body.56
The Court’s call for heightened scrutiny likely had to do with the unique history
of the admissions process at the University of Texas. In 1996, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Hopwood v. Texas,57 openly rejected the diversity rationale
and prohibited the use of race except when necessary to correct an institution’s
own past discrimination.58 As a result, for nearly a decade, all public colleges
and universities in Texas had to rely on race-neutral admissions. One strategy,
the Top Ten Percent Plan, made automatic offers of admission to seniors who
graduated in the top ten percent of their class at recognized high schools in the
state.59 With this guarantee, the overwhelming majority of seats in the
University of Texas’s entering class were filled under the plan.60 Because
secondary schools were often identifiable by race and ethnicity, the plan also
generated substantial diversity in the student body.61 After Grutter overturned
Hopwood seven years later, the University of Texas continued to use the Top
Ten Percent Plan but supplemented it with a race-conscious process for filling
the remaining seats in the entering class.62 A disappointed applicant, Abigail
Fisher, argued that the university already had achieved substantial diversity
through race-neutral means and that race-conscious measures were therefore
constitutionally impermissible.63
The Court wanted stronger evidence that the university’s race-neutral
admissions process was inadequate and required some race-conscious
adjustments at the margins. On remand, the lower courts once again upheld the
admissions process based on evidence from a yearlong study conducted by the

54. 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
55. Id. at 312–14.
56. Id.
57. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
58. Id. at 934–35.
59. Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 305.
60. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016). The Texas legislature subsequently allowed the
University of Texas at Austin to cap admissions under the plan to seventy-five percent of the freshman
class. Id.
61. Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 304–05.
62. Id. at 305–06.
63. See id. at 306; Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211–12.
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university.64 That research found that a substantial number of undergraduate
classes still were not racially diverse, and that students from underrepresented
backgrounds continued to feel isolated on campus.65 Armed with these findings,
the Court ultimately affirmed the permissibility of the affirmative action
program, while the dissent complained that the majority had retreated from an
earlier promise of exacting scrutiny when it first remanded the case to the
district court.66
Today, the battle over affirmative action in higher education continues in
the courts. Remarkably, one of the most high-profile challenges, Students for
Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College,67 relates to
Harvard University’s undergraduate admissions program, the very program
that Justice Powell held up as a model in Bakke.68 Harvard has defended its
exercise of institutional autonomy, citing a need for “the freedom and flexibility
to create the diverse communities that are vital to the learning experience of
every student.”69 Meanwhile, the plaintiff in the case, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. (“SFFA”), has alleged that Harvard is engaging in reverse
discrimination against Asian American applicants and that “the Supreme Court
was misled” because the undergraduate admissions program “has always been
an elaborate mechanism for hiding Harvard’s systematic campaign of racial and
ethnic discrimination against disfavored classes of applicants.”70 The federal
district court rebuffed these allegations, and a court of appeals affirmed the
decision.71 Even so, the litigation reveals the ongoing conflict over Justice
Powell’s compromise, as Harvard seeks to shield its program on First
Amendment grounds and the plaintiff indicts it as violating equality norms
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
SFFA has filed a similar complaint against the University of North
Carolina (“UNC”).72 The lawsuit alleges that UNC’s undergraduate admissions
process “is not using race merely as a ‘plus factor’” but is applying racial
64. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 659–
60 (5th Cir. 2014)).
65. See id. at 2211–12.
66. See id. at 2214–15; id. at 2215–17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
67. 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d, 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020).
68. See Complaint at 3, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard
Coll., 397 F. Supp. 126 (D. Mass. 2015) (No. 14-CV-14176-DJC), 2014 WL 6241935, at *3 [hereinafter
Harvard Complaint].
69. Nick Anderson, Justice Department Criticizes Harvard Admissions in Case Alleging Bias Against
Asian Americans, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2018/
08/30/justice-dept-criticizes-harvard-affirmative-action-case/ [https://perma.cc/3RYG-975R (dark
archive)].
70. Harvard Complaint, supra note 68, at 3.
71. In particular, the federal district court ruled that Harvard did not intentionally discriminate
against Asian Americans. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 3d at 147–48, 201–04.
72. See Complaint at 1–2, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 14-cv-00954
(M.D.N.C. filed Nov. 17, 2014), 2014 WL 6386755, at *1–2.
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preferences “so large that race becomes the ‘defining feature of [a student’s]
application.’”73 To support that assertion, SFFA cites “the disparate treatment
of high-achieving Asian-American and white applicants and underrepresented
minority applicants with inferior academic credentials.”74 According to the
complaint, UNC has persisted in using a heavy-handed, race-conscious
approach when race-neutral measures, such as a Top Ten Percent Plan, could
achieve significant diversity.75 Recently, a federal district court upheld the
admissions process, concluding that UNC had a compelling interest in enrolling
a diverse student body, had employed a narrowly tailored form of holistic
review, and had regularly considered the viability of race-neutral alternatives.76
In response, SFFA filed a petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review
the district court ruling in the UNC case along with the lower court decisions
in the Harvard lawsuit.77 The Court has granted certiorari to hear both cases.78
According to court commentators, SFFA’s request for joint review creates an
opportunity to abolish or significantly restrict affirmative action at all
institutions of higher education, whether public or private.79
As the Harvard and UNC lawsuits remind us, the middle way that Justice
Powell forged in Bakke clearly has not resolved the constitutional controversy
over affirmative action in higher education. As biographer John C. Jeffries, Jr.
notes, Justice Powell was a “pragmatic conservative”80 whose opinions reflected
a “mosaic of accommodation, highly differentiated and strongly variegated but
of a generally conservative hue.”81 Bakke displays Justice Powell’s penchant for
balancing competing interests as well as his rejection of a narrowly textual,
formalist approach.82 In the intervening years, the Court has consistently
embraced the approach set forth in Bakke, but the rise of formalism under both
73. Id. at 4 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 5–6.
76. Trial Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 6–15, 18–31, 93–118, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 14-CV-00954-LCB-JLW (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 18, 2021).
77. Anemona Hartocollis, The Supreme Court Tactic that Aims To Kill Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/11/us/affirmative-action-harvard-unc.html
[https://perma.cc/6VTB-SDJN (dark archive)].
78. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Anemona Hartocollis, Supreme Court Will Hear Challenge to
Affirmative Action at Harvard and U.N.C., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/
2022/01/24/us/politics/supreme-court-affirmative-action-harvard-unc.html [https://perma.cc/63H7-Z
V6Y (dark archive)]; Laura Krantz & Deirdre Fernandes, Supreme Court To Hear Harvard Affirmative
Action Case, Could Cause ‘Huge Ripple Effect’ in College Admissions, BOS. GLOBE, https://
www.bostonglobe.com/2022/01/24/metro/future-affirmative-action-higher-education-limbo-supremecourt-agrees-hear-harvard-case/ [https://perma.cc/YY4V-3XGF (dark archive)] (Jan. 24, 2022, 7:57
PM).
79. Hartocollis, supra note 77.
80. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 470 (1994).
81. Id. at 403.
82. Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854,
1854–55 (1995).
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the First and Fourteenth Amendments presents new challenges for the diversity
rationale.
II. THE UNBEARABLE EMPTINESS OF FORMALISM AND THE PROBLEMS
POSED FOR THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The delicate balance between First and Fourteenth Amendment interests
that undergirds the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence is increasingly
imperiled by an unduly formalist approach to both sources of constitutional
protection.83 Formalism has many meanings, but here I use the term to refer to
a heavy reliance on textual analysis, particularly to determine the “plain
meaning” of relevant language. Judges may rely on the text itself, legislative
history, and even legislative intent to discern that meaning.84 However, courts
typically do not strike pragmatic compromises of the type that characterized
Justice Powell’s jurisprudence. Instead, a formalist approach is closely linked to
reasoning by analogy.85 That form of reasoning in turn can lead to juridical
missteps that have serious implications for affirmative action.
A.

Formalism’s Failings: False Equivalencies and Missed Analogies

Formalism and analogical reasoning can lead to two kinds of
jurisprudential failings: false equivalencies and missed analogies. These
mistakes are mirror images of one another. A false equivalency treats categories
as the same when they are different, while a missed analogy treats categories as
different when they are the same. These difficulties arise because formalist
analogies often interpret facts narrowly without considering the values that a
particular rule of law serves.86 The resulting blind spots can pose problems for
a range of constitutional issues.
Under equal protection law, for example, scholars have mainly elaborated
on the problem of wrongly treating categories as the same when they are in fact

83. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard
Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1504–09 (2007) [hereinafter Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment
Institutions]; R. George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 LAW & INEQ. 1, 1–3, 5–6
(2016).
84. Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV.
305, 309–11 (2003).
85. Id. at 312. There have been disputes over whether formalism and formalist analogy are two
aspects of the same form of legal reasoning or are different, albeit closely related forms. Id. at 314. This
matter of taxonomy does not affect the arguments here. Despite disagreements over how to categorize
and operationalize analogical reasoning, the notion that like cases should be treated alike remains a
bedrock principle of American law. Brian N. Larson, Law’s Enterprise: Argumentation Schemes & Legal
Analogy, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (2019). Analogies therefore are a well-accepted means to
promote fairness and predictability in the legal community. Id. at 667–68.
86. Huhn, supra note 84, at 315.
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different.87 Most notably, by ignoring relevant context, the Court has expressed
a deep distrust of all racial classifications, regardless of whether officials use
them to address racial stratification or entrench racial subordination. As a result,
critics say the Justices have lost sight of the central aim of equal protection:
fighting ongoing racial inequities.88 In particular, the Court has repeatedly
failed to recognize distinctions between the transgressive history of
discrimination against underrepresented groups and reverse discrimination
against Whites.89 Although false equivalencies are most prominent in equal
protection doctrine, there are also examples in First Amendment law. For
instance, the Court recently ruled that a closely held, for-profit corporation has
standing to assert that a regulation designed to protect women’s access to
contraception unconstitutionally burdens religious liberty interests.90 A
formalist conception of personhood has led some Justices to wrongly equate
adherents of faith and nonprofit religious organizations on the one hand with
for-profit businesses that have incidental religious commitments on the other.91
As a result, courts have grown unduly deferential to a wide array of actors
claiming some form of religious affiliation, even when that deference
undermines principles of nondiscrimination for vulnerable groups.92
In addition to false equivalencies, formalism can produce missed analogies
if judges fail to acknowledge and explain differential treatment of similarly
situated groups. With a narrow focus on facts rather than underlying values,
formalist analogies compartmentalize areas of the law, making it easy to
overlook similarities across different jurisprudential categories. Precisely for
that reason, missed analogies can be more difficult to discern than false
equivalencies.93 Missed analogies pose considerable difficulties for affirmative
action law. For instance, First Amendment scholars argue that the Justices have
given insufficient weight to an institution’s unique identity, most importantly
the role that it plays in fostering dialogue and exchange.94 Consequently, the
Court’s rationale for according some institutions substantial deference while

87. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9, 31 (2003) (“By reinterpreting and remembering the civil
rights movement through the formalist lens of anticlassification, white America could more easily
believe that racial inequality was a thing of the past . . . .”).
88. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1546–47 (2004).
89. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 239–300 (1978).
90. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 691, 705–09 (2014).
91. See id. at 739–40, 751–54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92. See id.
93. See Huhn, supra note 84, at 314–15, 380.
94. Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 5, at 567.
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imposing strict standards of review on others remains mysterious.95 Most
significantly, the Justices have provided robust protections for the autonomy of
religious organizations, even as protections for academic freedom at colleges
and universities remain considerably weaker.96 This differential treatment is
largely overlooked because the Court ignores the ways in which both kinds of
institutions advance critically important discourse, a valuable function that is
one of the First Amendment’s core concerns.97
The difficulties associated with missed analogies are not limited to the
First Amendment. Under equal protection law, ascribed traits trigger different
degrees of judicial scrutiny. As a result of this constitutional hierarchy, racebased government action prompts the most searching level of review, while
gender-based decisions result in a less rigorous, intermediate level of scrutiny.
Government actions relating to a wide swath of individual characteristics,
including alienage, illegitimacy, and poverty, regularly receive highly
deferential, hands-off treatment.98 The reasoning behind these markedly
different degrees of scrutiny can seem puzzling at times.99 In recent cases, for
instance, courts have upheld the autonomy to discriminate against gays and
lesbians based on religious beliefs about the propriety of same-sex marriage.100
In doing so, judges regularly offer assurances that these holdings will not
legitimize racial discrimination on religious grounds; race is different, the courts
say.101 Yet, gays and lesbians, like racial minorities, have experienced a long
history of bias and hostility, and sincere religious beliefs can underlie both kinds
95. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1520–21 (noting that the
Court’s institutional agnosticism has produced stark differences in the treatment of colleges and
universities on the one hand and churches on the other).
96. Id. at 1516–22.
97. See id. at 1520–22 (offering reasons why colleges and universities might be treated differently
than churches if courts recognized their roles as First Amendment institutions).
98. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1970) (poverty); Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 509–10 (1976) (illegitimacy); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1978) (same); Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80–81 (1979) (alienage). The Court’s treatment of alienage and illegitimacy
has fluctuated over time with some decisions using a “rational basis” test and some using a more
exacting level of scrutiny. Jane Guerin, Illegitimates and Equal Protection: Lalli v. Lalli—A Retreat from
Trimble v. Gordon, 57 DENV. L.J. 453, 454–60 (2021) (illegitimacy); Brian Soucek, The Return of
Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 173–86 (2014) (alienage).
99. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485–91, 494–578 (2004)
(describing the varying degrees of scrutiny applied in equal protection analyses).
100. For a discussion of the growing conflict between religious liberty and marriage equality, see
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of
Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1176–77, 1180–95 (2012). There is
preliminary evidence that religious exemptions can increase discrimination against same-sex couples.
Netta Barak-Corren, Religious Exemptions Increase Discrimination Toward Same-Sex Couples: Evidence
from Masterpiece Cakeshop, 50 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 75–76, 104–06 (2021).
101. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 733 (2014) (“The principal
dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be
cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. . . . Our decision today provides no such shield.”).
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of discrimination.102 Because of a heavy reliance on formal categories, courts
have offered no persuasive rationale to explain why religious adherents can
discriminate against gays and lesbians with impunity but must face severe
consequences if they discriminate against racial minorities.103
Formalism’s failings can be especially troublesome for affirmative action
jurisprudence because of the ways in which the First and Fourteenth
Amendments interact in Bakke and its progeny. With respect to the First
Amendment, for instance, scholars have taken the Court to task for failing to
attend to the speaker’s identity when affording protections to speech,
association, and religious expression.104 Because of this agnosticism, the Justices’
decisions lack the nuance that would come with a close attention to the
institutional characteristics that matter in advancing the First Amendment’s
goals.105 Without that sensitivity to context, courts can easily lose sight of Justice
Powell’s underlying reasons for conferring robust institutional autonomy on
colleges and universities.
As for the Fourteenth Amendment, critics have challenged the Court’s
equal protection doctrine for its rigid adherence to a principle of colorblindness,
which emphasizes the dangers of official race-based classifications and ignores
historical discrimination and the lived experience of race. According to these
scholars, the Justices’ indifference to context leads them to overlook the central
thrust of the Fourteenth Amendment, that is, the effort to combat racial
subordination in all its manifestations.106 As a result, courts can fail to
comprehend why Justice Powell left room for race-conscious admissions under
a strict scrutiny test. Because blind spots like these can make Justice Powell’s
compromise in Bakke seem mystifying, I turn now to a careful analysis of
formalism’s failings under the First and the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.

A Closer Look at Formalism’s Failings in First Amendment Jurisprudence

When thinking about the future of affirmative action, few attend to the
dangers of formalism under the First Amendment. However, a formalist
102. See Oleske, supra note 11, at 101–02, 104–10, 119–21 (describing parallels between religious
objections to interracial and same-sex marriages and noting that the courts have been more receptive
to the latter because of an unwillingness to accord vigorous constitutional protection to sexual
orientation under the Equal Protection Clause).
103. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738–44 (2020).
104. Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 7, at 84–85; Horwitz, Universities
as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1523; Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1270 (2005).
105. Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 5, at 569; Horwitz, Universities as First
Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1504–07; Schauer, supra note 104, at 1256–60.
106. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1013–14 (1993); Cedric Merlin Powell,
Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIA.
L. REV. 191, 212 (1997).
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approach should be a real concern because it blinds the Court to contextual
considerations that bear on the Constitution’s underlying goals. Scholars like
Paul Horwitz have been highly critical of the Court’s “top-down, institutionally
agnostic approach,” one that treats the particularities of a speaker’s identity as
largely irrelevant to the level of protection that liberty interests should
receive.107 In his view, the Justices “strive to craft pure, formal doctrine,” but
they “are confronted with brute facts that ill fit the hermetic doctrinal structure
they have erected.”108 Out of a misplaced yearning for acontextuality, the Court
has made egregious blunders. The most notable is a failure to recognize any
special privileges for the press based on concerns that the Court cannot fashion
comprehensive and cogent criteria to determine who qualifies as a journalist.109
Similarly, Horwitz argues, the Justices have failed to account for distinct
features of religious groups, instead embracing a formally neutral approach, out
of fear that courts cannot “weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs.”110 In Horwitz’s view, the Court’s commitment
to formalism has survived without descending into doctrinal incoherence only
because a norm of deference allows institutions themselves to grapple with the
messy reality of their specific circumstances.111
There are significant questions about when deference is due and how much
should be given to different types of institutions. To rectify the limits of a
formalist approach, Horwitz draws on the seminal work of constitutional
scholar Frederick Schauer to argue for judicial recognition of what he terms
“First Amendment institutions.”112 Cognizant of the speaker’s identity and how
it relates to core First Amendment values, Horwitz singles out these institutions
because they play a uniquely important role in advancing speech, association,
and sectarian beliefs.113 Prominent examples include “the press, universities,
religious associations, [and] libraries.”114 All of these organizations deserve
substantial deference because they are well established and have internal norms
and practices that safeguard First Amendment values.115 By granting these
institutions presumptive autonomy, the Court can avoid factual quagmires and
allow trustworthy organizations to adapt to their own unique challenges.116

107. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1503–04; see also Schauer,
supra note 104, at 1259–60, 1270–73.
108. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1508.
109. Id. at 1505.
110. Id. (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)).
111. Id. at 1509.
112. Id. at 1510.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1510–11.
116. See id. at 1511–12.
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This strategy requires some elaboration of what qualifies as a First
Amendment institution. Despite the Court’s waning deference in recent
affirmative action cases, Horwitz concludes that universities easily merit
autonomy to advance the exchange of ideas.117 After all, the raison d’être for
institutions of higher education is the promotion of discourse, and they are ideal
sites for democratic experimentalism through lively interchange.118 Moreover,
colleges and universities are readily identifiable, allaying any concern that it
could prove hard to limit the scope of First Amendment privileges.119 Finally,
institutions of higher education have developed “a highly disciplined
environment” with strong norms and procedures to protect the integrity of
academic discourse.120
Even as the Court has heightened its scrutiny of colleges’ and universities’
admissions practices, it has grown increasingly deferential to religious
organizations. The Justices have adopted this stance on largely formalist
grounds. For one thing, the First Amendment expressly acknowledges religious
liberties as constitutionally protected interests.121 Moreover, religious
institutions have figured prominently in the nation’s history and remain
influential today.122 According to Horwitz, the Court’s insistence on formal
neutrality in state action and its failure to fully acknowledge the special nature
of religious organizations has led to a strained constitutional jurisprudence.123
In his view, “[t]he courts will bend and distort existing doctrine to take account
of institutional variation, while still trying to preserve some sense of their
attachment to acontextual legal categories.”124 By recognizing that churches and
other religious organizations are indeed First Amendment institutions, Horwitz
argues, the Court can accord them strong deference as presumptively selfgoverning institutions insofar as they advance a discourse related to matters of
faith.125
Precisely because First Amendment institutionalism rests squarely on
values and context, it offers a way to discern formalism’s failings when it comes
to protecting the kind of autonomy and equality interests that lie at the heart
of affirmative action jurisprudence. Those shortcomings include both false
equivalencies and missed analogies, which pose distinct threats. False
equivalencies have greatly expanded the number of organizations allowed to

14.

117. See Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 5, at 568–69, 579–80.
118. See id. at 575–76; Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1513–
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1513–14.
Id. at 1514–15.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 7, at 82, 102–03, 114–15.
See id. at 85–86.
Id. at 86.
See id. at 88–89.
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discriminate with impunity based on religious beliefs. At the same time, missed
analogies have weakened academic freedom claims that undergird the diversity
rationale.
1. The Danger of False Equivalencies
Understanding why actors qualify as First Amendment institutions is
essential to avoid the dangers of false equivalency. False equivalencies can
extend judicial deference to organizations when they should be subject to
scrutiny. That danger has materialized with a steady expansion in the category
of religious actors authorized to discriminate with impunity, a development that
should be of concern to equality scholars, including those focused on affirmative
action.126 The issue came to a head in the Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.127 There, the plaintiffs, closely held family corporations,
asserted that their owners’ religious liberties had been violated by a federal
requirement mandating that employers provide contraceptive coverage for
female staff.128 The complaint relied on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
which provides more vigorous protection to religious institutions than the Free
Exercise Clause does—at least based on some interpretations of Supreme Court
precedent.129 The lower courts rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that
for-profit corporations were incapable of exercising religious liberties.130
In an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court reversed, holding that
owners of closely held corporations, even if large and run for profit, could
pursue charitable goals and religious purposes as part of their mission.131 The
Court refrained from inquiring into the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ religious
views on contraception, nor did it question the reasonableness of their
conclusion that providing contraceptive coverage for employees would violate
those beliefs.132 Given the substantial fines that the companies could incur for
failing to offer the coverage, the Court found a substantial burden on the
plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion.133 That burden could be justified only if the
federal requirement regarding contraceptive coverage was necessary to advance

126. See Nathan B. Oman, Doux Commerce, Religion, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 92
IND. L.J. 693, 698–701 (2017); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 93 (2015); Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized
Marketplace, 7 ALA. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 142–49 (2015); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious
Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 625 (2015).
127. 573 U.S. 682.
128. Id. at 700–04.
129. Id. at 693–95.
130. Id. at 702, 704.
131. Id. at 710–13. The Court did not extend its analysis to publicly traded companies, however.
Id. at 717.
132. Id. at 717–19, 723–24.
133. Id. at 720–26.
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a compelling interest.134 Even assuming the federal government had a
compelling interest in protecting women’s health, the majority concluded there
was a less restrictive alternative: using an accommodation that agency officials
already had devised for religious nonprofits that objected to funding the
coverage.135
Justice Alito’s opinion prompted a sharp dissent from Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who contended that the majority had falsely equated individuals,
churches, and religious nonprofits—all centrally involved in the formation of
faith-based communities—with for-profit companies led by owners who
incidentally held certain religious beliefs.136 According to Justice Ginsburg, the
Court had relied on an impoverished, formalist conception of personhood that
did not distinguish between natural persons capable of sectarian worship,
churches and nonprofits dedicated to cultivating communities of faith, and forprofit corporations with some ancillary faith-based commitments.137
In keeping with Justice Ginsburg’s concerns, legal scholar Elizabeth
Sepper has warned of the dangers associated with “zombie religious
institutions.”138 In her view, a presumption of autonomy for religious
organizations has gone hand in hand with a tendency to defer to their selfdesignation as sectarian, however tenuous. As a result, the number of religious
institutions that can escape regulatory mandates, including nondiscrimination
laws, has steadily grown.139 In line with Horwitz’s analysis of First Amendment
institutions, Sepper acknowledges that “religious institutions have intrinsic as
well as instrumental value and prove uniquely able to protect individual
conscience through their independent and autonomous existence.”140 She
recognizes that institutional rights are distinguishable from individual rights
and that “[r]eligious institutions . . . are not just like other associations but play
a distinctive role in the social order.”141 Sepper’s concern, however, is that
courts’ increasingly expansive definition of religious institutions dilutes the
justification for deferring to these largely self-governing organizations.142 In the
field of health care, for example, sectarian hospitals have merged with secular
ones, producing systems with faith-based characteristics that range from
negligible to pervasive.143 Sepper worries that allowing exemptions for anything
134. Id. at 726.
135. Id. at 728–31.
136. See id. at 739–40, 751–54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 754–56.
138. Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 929, 930–32 (2018)
[hereinafter Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions] (focusing on Catholic healthcare institutions).
139. See id. at 955–57, 963–64.
140. Id. at 968.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 964.
143. See id. at 937–43.
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but “pervasively sectarian institutions” will undermine the rationale for
according substantial autonomy to religious organizations under the First
Amendment.144
Acknowledging how organizations function as First Amendment
institutions could avoid the dangers of false equivalency that have emerged in
cases like Hobby Lobby and in the health care industry. In particular, before
according deference, courts should ask whether a for-profit company plays a
central role in fostering religious discourse in communities of faith. As Justice
Ginsburg observed in her dissent, the Court has conferred free exercise
protections on churches and nonprofit religious organizations because “‘[f]or
many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from
participation in a larger religious community,’ and ‘furtherance of the autonomy
of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well.’”145
In Ginsburg’s view, according similar protections to for-profit corporations is
not appropriate because, unlike churches and nonprofit religious organizations,
these companies do not “exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to
the same religious faith.”146
An approach rooted in the concept of First Amendment institutions allows
for a more searching analysis of the Hobby Lobby majority’s conclusions about
the scope of religious autonomy. The Court based its deference to the
company’s rejection of contraceptive coverage on a corporate statement of
purpose, the owners’ pledges to run the business in a manner consistent with
Christian principles, and the companies’ charitable activities, which were
designed to promote the Christian faith.147 The Court noted that Hobby Lobby,
like many for-profit corporations, pursued charitable causes even when those
efforts hurt the bottom line.148 The Court concluded that family-owned
corporations like these should have free exercise rights as a way to “protect[]
the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”149
In short, the mission statement, pledges, and decisions about charitable giving
promoted discourse about Christianity among the family owners. However, it
is hard to see how that dialogic community extended to employees, some
Christian and some not, who had no real say in the commitments that the

82.

144. Id. at 985 (quoting Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976)); see id. at 979–

145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 752 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
146. Id. at 754.
147. See id. at 701, 703 (majority opinion).
148. See id. at 703, 711–12.
149. Id. at 707.
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owners made.150 Given that churches and other religious organizations receive
deference to foster communities of faith, it seems appropriate to protect family
owners’ free exercise rights as an individual matter but inappropriate to confer
additional protection because they happen to oversee a closely held corporation.
This is especially true because owners’ decisions about contraceptive coverage
appear unlikely to spark a company-wide, faith-based discussion of Christian
principles.
A similar approach can resolve the problem of zombie religious
institutions in the health care industry that Professor Sepper describes. She has
argued that only “pervasively sectarian” hospitals should benefit from religious
exemptions based on faith-based beliefs and practices. She distinguishes these
nonprofit institutions, which are sponsored by a religious order and
recognizably religious, from hospitals that are largely secular but accept some
faith-based restrictions or obligations under merger agreements.151 Sepper
argues that only pervasively sectarian healthcare providers are true to a history
of faith-based care that treats these services as an extension of a religious
ministry.152 For that reason, she says, only those hospitals deserve religious
exemptions, a view consistent with First Amendment institutionalism.153
Conversely, if hospitals do not foster formative discourse about religion because
they operate in a secular manner except for some incidental faith-based
commitments, there is no reason to accord these healthcare providers
heightened deference based on religion.
The dangers of false equivalencies in defining religious organizations
demonstrate the shortcomings of the Court’s agnosticism about a speaker’s
identity. By ignoring the values that motivate deference to institutions, the
Justices have allowed entities with the slimmest of connections to sectarian
beliefs to engage in discriminatory practices.154 By contrast, Justice Powell’s
decision in Bakke was highly contextual and explicitly driven by First
Amendment objectives. He expressly acknowledged the unique role of colleges
and universities in advancing the robust exchange of ideas as a way to justify
the need for a diverse student body. The Court’s recent failure to engage with
context and values in cases like Hobby Lobby undercuts the First Amendment
institutionalism that made Justice Powell’s approach to diversity both
intelligible and persuasive. A purely formalist approach has the potential to
leave academic freedom unmoored from the purposes it serves and open to
150. See id. at 745–46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga would override significant interests of the corporations’ employees and covered dependents.
It would deny legions of women who do not hold their employers’ beliefs access to contraceptive
coverage . . . .”).
151. Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, supra note 138, at 985–87.
152. Id. at 935–36.
153. See id. at 932.
154. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 707–13, 716–19, 735–36.
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charges that any consideration of race in admissions is simply impermissible
discrimination, as Professor Sunstein has warned. Colleges and universities are
especially vulnerable to formalism’s failings because they cannot invoke a faithbased label as a shield against intrusive judicial scrutiny. As a consequence,
formalism has the potential to weaken deference to institutions of higher
education even as regard for religious institutions flourishes, a danger of missed
analogies to which this discussion now turns.
2. The Danger of Missed Analogies
The dangers associated with missed analogies are of special concern to
affirmative action jurisprudence. These failures of formalism are often
overlooked because a narrow focus on parsing textual passages leads to
compartmentalization of doctrinal holdings.155 Yet, these kinds of blind spots
pose important dangers because they can diminish the standing of colleges and
universities as First Amendment institutions, even as churches and other
religious organizations become paradigmatic examples. The growing disparity
will go largely unremarked because distinct judicial precedents apply, but the
differential treatment nonetheless can corrode respect for the special mission of
institutions of higher education.156 That regard has long been fundamental to
the Court’s protection of affirmative action in higher education under an
academic freedom rationale.
The dangers of missed analogies are well illustrated by the different
degrees of scrutiny that the Court applies to institutions, all of which play a
significant role in advancing the exchange of ideas so prized by the First
Amendment. According to Professor Horwitz, First Amendment
institutionalism produces distinct levels of deference, which in turn lead to
significant disparities in the treatment of colleges and universities on the one
hand and religious organizations on the other. Under a “weak-form” version,
courts accord deference to institutions in their areas of expertise but otherwise
are prepared to scrutinize their policies and practices.157 Horwitz concludes that
the Court has used this approach when reviewing the conduct of colleges and
universities in affirmative action cases. The Justices have deferred to judgments
about academic mission and goals but have closely scrutinized the choice of
means.158 In Bakke, for example, Justice Powell accepted the diversity rationale
but rejected other objectives related to redress of societal discrimination because
155. See Huhn, supra note 84, at 314–15 (noting that analogical reasoning requires judges to
determine whether a previously decided case is sufficiently “on point” to count as precedent; formalist
analogies may focus narrowly on factual parallels and ignore similarities based on values).
156. See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J. COLL. & U.L. 79, 132–
33 (2004).
157. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1516.
158. Id. at 1516–17.
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they fell outside the purview of academic expertise regarding the learning
process.159 In addition, he was quite ready to substitute his own judgment about
the appropriate means to achieve the goal of diversity by endorsing Harvard’s
approach to undergraduate admissions while invalidating the medical school’s
set-aside program.160 This limited deference to colleges and universities has
persisted, most notably when the Court in Fisher I demanded that the
University of Texas provide hard evidence that race-conscious admissions
programs remained necessary to achieve diversity in the student body.161
Under a “medium-form” version of First Amendment institutionalism, the
courts treat organizations that advance critically important dialogue as
substantially autonomous so long as they operate within their designated
sphere.162 These institutions have “a fairly substantial positive privilege to rebut
government attempts to intrude upon their ability to shape their own affairs,”
as long as they demonstrate adherence to their own well-developed internal
norms and processes.163 If the Court had adopted this approach for colleges and
universities, Horwitz says, there would be far more deference not just to
pedagogical goals but also to the policies and practices used to realize them.164
That deference would allow admissions officers considerably more leeway in
administering race-conscious programs without fear of legal challenge.
Finally, courts could rely on a “strong-form” version of deference, which
assumes that institutions “operate on a largely self-regulating basis,” placing
them “outside of the supervision of external legal regimes.”165 Under this
approach, colleges and universities would command “near-absolute discretion”
to “compos[e] classes based explicitly on considerations of race or gender”
because these institutions would be presumptively autonomous.166 Clearly,
institutions of higher education do not enjoy this kind of hands-off institutional
independence.167 However, churches and religious organizations now receive
the highest level of deference for their autonomous decision-making under the
First Amendment.
Heightened deference to sectarian institutions manifests itself in several
ways. First, courts have refused to exercise “subject-matter jurisdiction over the
internal affairs of religious organizations.”168 This approach stems in part from
159. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
160. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 285, 316–18 (1978).
161. See Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 311–14 (2013).
162. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1518.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1518–19.
165. Id. at 1519–20.
166. Id. at 1520.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 1520–21 (quoting Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1589).
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a sense that judges are ill equipped to second-guess faith-based judgments.169
For instance, the Court has repeatedly made clear that it cannot evaluate the
sincerity of religious beliefs without unduly intruding into sectarian matters.170
As a result, when faith-based institutions adopt the view that the Bible prohibits
same-sex marriage, courts have accepted the authenticity of this belief without
question.171 Moreover, the Court has refrained from judging the reasonableness
of a religious organization’s conclusion that compliance with a government
regulation would significantly burden a religious belief.172 So, the Justices have
accepted uncritically the claim that providing contraceptive coverage to women
under company health care plans, for example, would render faith-based
organizations complicit in sinful behavior.173 Finally, the Court has protected
the autonomy of churches and religious organizations by immunizing important
choices that they make about internal operations, most notably the employment
of faith leaders under the ministerial exception.174 Although denominated as
ministerial, the exception has steadily expanded beyond pastors to include
teachers at religious schools, press secretaries, counselors, and church
organists.175 By treating all of these employees as equivalently central to faithbased concerns, courts have allowed churches and other religious entities to
make hiring, promotion, and firing decisions that are beyond the reach of
antidiscrimination laws. Judges simply will not evaluate whether race, gender,
age, or other protected traits played an impermissible role in these employment
actions.176
169. See Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 7, at 97–98 (arguing that
judges cannot make “determinations about who is the true church” and must refrain from intruding on
religious sovereignty).
170. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 717–19, 723–24 (2014).
171. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018);
Knapp v. City of Couer D’Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1121 (D. Idaho 2016); 303 Creative LLC v.
Elemis, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1161 (D. Colo. 2019); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448
P.3d 890, 921 (Ariz. 2019).
172. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 717–19, 723–24.
173. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2383–
84 (2020); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691. See generally Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518–19 (2015)
(arguing that complicity-based conscience claims differ from traditional religious accommodation
claims because of the concentrated costs imposed on citizens outside the faith-based community).
174. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2061–62 (2020); HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012).
175. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171–74 (teacher); Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2049
(same); Sterlinski v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 934 F.3d 568, 569, 572 (7th Cir. 2019) (music director and
organist); Rogers v. Salvation Army, No. 14-12656, 2015 WL 2186007, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. May 11,
2015) (counselor); Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Ky. 2014)
(professor) (“Although ministerial it is in name, the exception . . . has been applied to lay employees,
seminary professors, hospital workers, press secretaries, musicians, and many others.”).
176. See, e.g., Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 884 F.3d 416, 424–26 (2d Cir. 2018) (rejecting an
African American pastor’s employment discrimination claims due to the ministerial exception);
Moreno v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island, No. CV 14-7231, 2016 WL 8711448, at *7–10 (E.D.N.Y.
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Clearly, the courts’ treatment of institutions of higher education and
religious institutions has been widely divergent, even though both qualify as
First Amendment institutions. Because relevant bodies of law have developed
independently under rubrics of academic freedom and the religion clauses,
courts have not even acknowledged the substantial disparities. That silence in
the face of a missed analogy has continued, even as the Justices have
simultaneously grown more aggressive in questioning universities’ exercise of
discretion and more deferential to claims of religious autonomy.177 If the Court
were to recognize the differential treatment, a formalist response might
emphasize that the Constitution nowhere explicitly mentions academic
freedom, while protections for religious liberty feature prominently in the text
of the First Amendment itself.178 That kind of response is distinctly
unsatisfying, of course, because it presumes that constitutional interpretation is
little more than literalism and parsing.179
It is no accident that “the judges who have contributed the most to creating
a doctrine of institutional academic freedom have been centrists, concerned for
some balance of freedom and order.”180 Like Justice Powell in Bakke, they “share
a regard for learning, appreciation for the complexity of institutional
arrangements, and skepticism about judicial lawmaking.”181 Inherent in
protections for academic freedom, then, is a recognition that the First
Amendment as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Whether or not
institutional autonomy for colleges and universities is explicitly mentioned,
their decisions are entitled to deference if they play a central part in advancing
the conditions for a flourishing democracy. As philosopher Martha Nussbaum
explains,
Jan. 20, 2016) (dismissing an African American pastor’s racial discrimination claim under the
ministerial exception); see also Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 997–99
(2013); Elizabeth Sepper, Ever-Expanding Immunity for Religious Institutions Augur Trouble for Worker
Protections, AM. CONST. SOC’Y EXPERT F. (July 14, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/everexpanding-immunity-for-religious-institutions-augurs-trouble-for-worker-protections/ [https://perma
.cc/247R-X58M].
177. See supra notes 94–97, 113–25, 156–67 and accompanying text; Horwitz, Fisher, Academic
Freedom, and Distrust, supra note 37, at 519–20, 526–29 (describing increasing distrust of academic
institutions among courts and the public). The distrust of American colleges and universities has deep
roots, including Justice Powell’s own concerns about liberal faculty who undermined students’ faith in
“the American political and economic system.” WINKLER, supra note 36, at 286.
178. See Dahlia Lithwick & Richard C. Schragger, Jefferson v. Cuccinelli: Does the Constitution
Really Protect a Right to “Academic Freedom”?, SLATE (June 1, 2010, 6:19 PM), https://www.slate.com/
news-and-politics/2010/06/does-the-constitution-really-protect-a-right-to-academic-freedom.html
[http://perma.cc/7GS6-4W7V].
179. See Owen Fiss, The Democratic Mission of the University, 76 ALB. L. REV. 735, 738 (2012)
(arguing that the method of interpreting the First Amendment has been purposive rather than
textualist).
180. Byrne, supra note 156, at 132.
181. Id.
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[o]ur country has embarked on an unparalleled experiment. . . . Unlike
all other nations, we ask a higher education to contribute a general
preparation for citizenship, not just specialized preparation for a career.
To a greater degree than all other nations, we have tried to extend the
benefits of this education to all citizens, whatever their class, race, sex,
ethnicity, or religion. We hope to draw citizens toward one another by
complex mutual understanding and individual self-scrutiny, building a
democratic culture that is truly deliberative and reflective . . . .182
Bakke and Grutter, taken together, endorse the constitutional significance of this
unique role for colleges and universities, one essential to the democratic
experiment the First Amendment was designed to safeguard. That vision is
integral to the part that academic freedom plays in affirmative action cases and
turns on a First Amendment institutionalism that transcends any narrowly
formalist interpretation.
That said, there may be some legitimate reasons to treat institutions of
higher education and religious organizations differently, but in light of the
underpinnings of the First Amendment, only a consideration of context can
reveal meaningful distinctions. For one thing, colleges and universities are
largely engaged in secular activities, while churches and religious organizations
devote themselves to faith-based activities. Judges therefore might conclude
that, as secular officials in a state-based system of adjudication, they are more
competent to evaluate academic decisions than they are sectarian ones.183 The
courts also might find that a range of institutions can encourage the secular
exchange of ideas much as colleges and universities do, while churches and
religious organizations play a singularly indispensable role in fostering faithbased dialogue.184
If the Court tacitly gives these considerations some weight, it might be
more willing to second-guess the pedagogical decisions of religious colleges and
universities than the sectarian commitments of churches. There is some
evidence that this is the case. In Bob Jones University v. United States,185 the
Internal Revenue Service denied a religiously affiliated university its tax
exemption because the school denied admission to and expelled students if they
engaged in interracial marriage or dating.186 According to school officials, the
policies were based on a sincere belief that the Bible forbade these behaviors.
The university therefore argued that it was entitled to a religious exemption
182. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF REFORM
IN LIBERAL EDUCATION 294 (1997).
183. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 83, at 1522.
184. See id. (arguing that universities may not occupy as central a role as churches do in individual
lives).
185. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
186. Id. at 579–82, 585. The case also addressed the tax-exempt status of Christian elementary and
secondary schools that had racially discriminatory admissions policies. Id. at 583–85.
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from federal antidiscrimination laws based on its free exercise of the Christian
faith.187
In marked contrast to the deference recently accorded to churches, the
Justices did not treat Bob Jones University as presumptively autonomous and
therefore free from scrutiny. Instead, citing the tax code and accompanying
regulations, the Court considered whether Bob Jones’s practices contravened an
important public policy.188 According to the eight-to-one decision, the federal
government’s interest in preventing racial discrimination was well established
through judicial precedent, congressional action, and agency interpretation.
That interest therefore sufficed to override Bob Jones’s claim to a religious
exemption.189 Notably, in joining the Bob Jones decision, Justice Powell focused
on the university’s autonomy as an institution of higher education, rather than
as a religious organization.190 For Justice Powell, Bakke and Bob Jones both
implicated the appropriate level of deference to afford pedagogical decisions
when colleges and universities make use of race. Even though Justice Powell
appreciated these parallel considerations, the two cases are seldom considered
together. Presumably the different sources of precedent, distinct situations, and
divergent outcomes have obscured their mutual relevance.
Courts could also explain the varying levels of deference for institutions
of higher education and religious organizations based on their status as public
and private institutions. That is, some colleges and universities are public, while
churches and other religious organizations are uniformly private. This
distinction is not entirely satisfying, however. In the affirmative action context,
the public/private divide provides little traction in evaluating the strength of an
academic freedom claim, a point brought home by SFFA’s recent request for
joint Supreme Court review of the Harvard and UNC cases. As these lawsuits
illustrate, both private and public universities invoke institutional autonomy to
be free of state overreach, most notably by federal courts.191 In defending their
187. Id. at 602–04.
188. See id. at 592–96, 604.
189. Id. at 604.
190. Bench Memorandum from Mark Newell to Justice Lewis F. Powell 30–33 (Oct. 2, 1982) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting that the advocates disagreed about whether Bob
Jones University sought an exemption as an educational or a religious organization); Handwritten
Notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell 2 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (observing that
William T. Coleman, appointed by the Court to defend the judgment below, had contended that Bob
Jones was seeking an exemption as an educational institution); Memorandum from Mark Newell to
Justice Lewis F. Powell 4 (Mar. 8, 1983) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (agreeing that
the Bob Jones case could come out differently if it were a seminary rather than a university preparing
students for secular careers).
191. See Philip Lee, A Contract Theory of Academic Freedom, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 461, 496 (2015)
(“When the government is acting against a university, then state action is implicated in a constitutional
claim. This is true whether the university is public or private.”). The same is not true “when a university
is acting against its own faculty members” and “a court must determine whether or not the institution
is a state actor before constitutional analysis can proceed.” Id.
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admissions policies, the University of California at Davis, the University of
Michigan, the University of Texas, and the University of North Carolina—all
public institutions—have offered rationales largely identical to those proffered
by a quintessentially private school like Harvard.192 Moreover, some states
expressly recognize that public colleges and universities are semisovereign,193
and many private universities accept large amounts of government funding and
agree to abide by public norms, including nondiscrimination mandates.194
Although sectarian institutions are necessarily private to avoid any official
establishment of a religion, the public/private distinction is not always a neat
one. For example, the Court increasingly has permitted churches and religious
organizations to pursue public funding.195 In doing so, the Justices typically try
to assure themselves that the grants will not lead to excessive government
entanglement in sectarian affairs.196 Moreover, as the Justices broaden eligibility
to make religious liberty claims, for-profit corporations increasingly assert these
rights, even though they operate in public markets in which their competitors
must comply with nondiscrimination mandates.197 Given these complexities, it
is not obvious that an organization’s designation as public or private should be
dispositive in deciding how central it is to fostering discourse or how much
autonomy it should enjoy as a First Amendment institution.
In sum, then, the formalism of the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence creates dangers of false equivalencies and missed analogies. False
equivalencies can lead to an expansive interpretation of which institutions enjoy
deference under the First Amendment, as with religious organizations. As
192. See Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 311–14 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–33 (2003);
Trial Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, supra note 76, at 6–15, 18–27, 93–118; Anderson, supra
note 69; supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a); Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500,
513 (Cal. 1993); Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 188 P.3d 629, 637 (Cal. 2008). See generally
Michael Park, Sovereignty and First Amendment Rights of Higher Education Institutions: An Affirmative and
Institutional Approach, 54 FIRST AMENDMENT STUD. 110, 113–14 (2020) (discussing how public
institutions of higher learning could assert free speech rights against the federal government); DAVID
F. LABAREE, A PERFECT MESS: THE UNLIKELY ASCENDANCY OF AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION 129–34 (2017) (recognizing that public and private universities are similar in many ways
but that private institutions may have somewhat more autonomy than public ones; however, the most
selective flagship public schools, where affirmative action is most significant, have considerable
autonomy).
194. Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2331, 2345 (2000) (arguing that Bakke treated Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause as
coextensive, so private universities that accept federal funds at least are bound by nondiscrimination
norms under Title VI).
195. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2254–57 (2020); Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019–25 (2017).
196. See, e.g., Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2260–61; Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2023–24.
197. See Zoë Robinson, What Is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 204–13 (2014)
(arguing that the definition of religious institutions should be linked to their unique and separate
institutional sovereignty and that courts should err on the side of a narrow definition).
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growing numbers of organizations clamor for presumptive autonomy, the
Justices confront a formidable task in explaining their hands-off approach to
institutional practices that violate public norms and leave vulnerable groups
susceptible to discrimination. At the same time, missed analogies allow the
Court to ignore the divergent treatment of churches, on the one hand, and
colleges and universities on the other. Institutions of higher education must
hew closely to principles of nondiscrimination, even as they try to diversify
their student bodies. At the same time, the Court has allowed more space for
religious organizations to discriminate with impunity based on sectarian beliefs.
The resulting doctrinal incoherence can call into question the Court’s
commitment to the norms of both institutional liberty and individual
equality.198 These formalist tendencies are at odds with an affirmative action
jurisprudence that rests on a broader appreciation of the First Amendment’s
role in safeguarding the conditions of democratic exchange. Bakke and its
progeny recognize the essential role that colleges and universities play in
advancing an inclusive and deliberative model of civic life. Formalism threatens
to undercut this understanding of institutional academic freedom by adopting
a wooden interpretation of the meaning of liberty and its relationship to
equality. In the next section, I turn to the ways in which formalism weakens the
concept of equality itself.
C.

A Closer Look at Formalism’s Failings in Equal Protection Jurisprudence

The failings of formalism infect both Fourteenth Amendment and First
Amendment jurisprudence. Under equal protection law, scholars mainly have
criticized the Court for a false equivalency, that is, adopting a colorblind
approach that applies strict scrutiny, regardless of whether race is used for
benign or malign purposes. As a result, in the affirmative action context, judges
treat reverse discrimination against White applicants like Allan Bakke as
constitutionally indistinguishable from discrimination against marginalized
racial and ethnic minorities. So long as admissions programs include race as one
factor in the decision-making process, the Justices apply an exacting level of
review that is extraordinarily hard to satisfy. The very prospect of strict scrutiny
narrows the range of programs that colleges and universities can adopt, requires
them to constantly gather evidence that continued reliance on race is justified,
and leaves even the most carefully crafted policies perennially open to legal
attack.
Despite the preoccupation with false equivalencies, missed analogies pose
dangers of their own to equality jurisprudence. The Court has relied on tiers of
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause that allow substantial leeway for
discrimination against some groups. The most notable example has been the
198. Id. at 230–31; Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, supra note 138, at 981–82.
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limited protection accorded to same-sex couples. The failure to acknowledge a
history of disadvantage and marginalization has allowed courts to uphold
exemptions that permit vendors to deny these couples wedding services based
on religious objections. The decisions regularly note that racial discrimination
is wholly distinct and utterly intolerable, even if differential treatment based on
sexual orientation is permissible.199 Due to this widely disparate treatment, the
increasingly contingent and uncertain reach of nondiscrimination mandates
undermines any principled understanding of equality.
1. The Danger of False Equivalencies
Colleges and universities must operate within the constitutional
constraints of colorblindness, as expressed through the strict scrutiny test, even
if they have a compelling interest in enrolling a diverse student body.200
Beginning with Bakke, the Court has made clear that it is unwilling to
distinguish among race-conscious admissions policies based on whether they
harm White applicants like Allan Bakke or burden members of historically
underrepresented minority groups. In his controlling opinion, Justice Powell
concluded that in “a Nation of minorities,” there is no meaningful way for the
Court to distinguish between well-intentioned and pernicious uses of race.201
Instead, the Justices must be vigilant in protecting any racial or ethnic group
that is targeted for differential treatment.202 Applying strict scrutiny to
affirmative action in higher education has prompted widespread criticism that
the Court is indifferent to history and context, elevating formal categories over
the lived experience of race.203 The false equivalency embedded in Bakke has, in
turn, altered the dynamics of affirmative action litigation, allowing conservative
think tanks and legal organizations to appropriate the language of civil rights to

199. See, e.g., Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 757 (8th Cir. 2019); Chelsey Nelson
Photography v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 479 F. Supp. 3d 543, 560 n.133 (W.D. Ky.
2020); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1163 (D. Colo. 2019); Brush & Nib Studio,
LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 915–16, 924 (Ariz. 2019) (finding protections against racial
discrimination under public accommodations laws will not be affected because they do not implicate
free speech interests and that Hobby Lobby rejects the “slippery slope” argument about other protected
classes).
200. David A. Strauss, Fisher v. University of Texas and the Conservative Case for Affirmative Action,
2016 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2–5, 16–18, 22–24 (describing how the demands of strict scrutiny can be an
uneasy fit with an amorphous interest in diversity and concluding that deference to institutional
tradition plays a key role in explaining the Court’s decisions).
201. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291–93 (1978).
202. Id. at 292–96.
203. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48–
52 (1991); R. Richard Banks, The Benign-Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection Analysis, 31 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 573, 575–77 (2003); Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and
Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1034–40 (2007).
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challenge the exclusion of prospective White (and, more recently, Asian
American) students from selective colleges and universities.204
Interestingly, most commentators have overlooked the irony inherent in
the Court’s formalist treatment of racial categories and its simultaneous rebuke
of college and university administrators for adopting unduly wooden
approaches to defining race. By equating reverse discrimination against White
applicants with discrimination against underrepresented racial and ethnic
minorities, the Justices have treated race as a fungible classification. That is, all
the categories are abstractions and there is no way to differentiate among them
based on a personal experience of race. At the same time, the Justices have taken
colleges to task for treating the racial and ethnic identities of minority
applicants as equivalent in the admissions process. In Gratz v. Bollinger,205 the
University of Michigan relied on a point system to determine which applicants
it would admit to the undergraduate class.206 When an applicant stated that he
or she was from an underrepresented racial or ethnic group, admissions officers
automatically allocated twenty points to the file without examining the
applicant’s life experiences further.207
This point system treated all underrepresented racial and ethnic categories
as indistinguishable and interchangeable. According to the Court, the emphasis
on abstract racial classifications violated the principle of holistic review because
it failed to treat applicants from underrepresented groups as individuals based
on their potential contributions to a diverse student body.208 A more nuanced
approach, one that accounted for experience, was required to evaluate racial and
ethnic identities. In a telling move, the Court invoked the pedagogical rationale
for affirmative action to reject the approach to racial classifications that it has
otherwise adopted under the Fourteenth Amendment.209 Ironically, the
formalism of these categories appeared to be at odds with the notion of diversity
that Justice Powell embraced in Bakke.

204. See generally ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE
CONSERVATIVE COALITION 12–18, 73 (2008) (describing how conservatives created their own
institutions to support a conservative agenda); Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the Conservative
Counterrevolution, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1698, 1700–02 (2018) (describing how conservative legal
advocates appropriated the strategies and tactics of public interest lawyers).
205. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
206. See id. at 255.
207. See id. at 256.
208. Id. at 271–72.
209. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218–27, 235 (1995) (describing the
evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence on racial preferences and mandating that strict scrutiny apply
to a federal program that considered race in awarding government contracts to remedy past societal
discrimination); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–500 (1989) (striking down
the city of Richmond’s preference for minority business enterprises under a strict scrutiny standard
and noting that Bakke similarly rejected amorphous efforts to correct societal discrimination).
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Beyond debates over the meaning of racial identity, there have been other
important concerns about false equivalencies under equal protection law. In the
Court’s 2018 decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Human Rights
Commission,210 the majority overturned penalties imposed on a Christian baker
who refused to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.211 The baker argued
that, under the First Amendment, officials could not force him to comply with
a public accommodations law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation.212 In his view, custom-made cakes were a form of expressive
activity, and the law compelled him to engage in speech endorsing same-sex
marriage when he would prefer to remain silent.213 Moreover, the baker claimed,
the law burdened his free exercise of religion because he was forced to choose
between adhering to his Christian belief that same-sex marriage is sinful or
incurring substantial fines that could destroy his business.214
At the time, many observers thought that Masterpiece Cakeshop would
resolve a growing controversy over whether for-profit businesses, ranging from
bakeries to photography shops to custom stationery stores, should be able to
obtain exemptions from laws requiring them to provide services for same-sex
weddings.215 The Court, however, sidestepped the issue by finding that
Colorado officials had acted with impermissible animus when they took
punitive actions against the baker. To reach that conclusion, the Justices relied
on some officials’ remarks that religious adherents had a long history of
invoking their faith to justify discrimination.216 In addition, the Court pointed
out that Colorado administrators had treated the owner of Masterpiece
Cakeshop differently than bakers who refused to serve customers ordering cakes
with derogatory messages about gays and lesbians.217 According to the Court,
this evidence sufficed to make out a case of illicit animus.218
Legal scholar Melissa Murray argues that Masterpiece Cakeshop relied on a
false equivalency that she describes as “inverted” animus.219 As she explains,
“[t]he oppressed victim of discrimination is no longer the ‘discrete and insular
minorities’ . . . , but rather religious objectors who were once trumpeted as a
‘moral majority,’ but now cloak themselves as ‘religious minorities’ in need of
210. 138 S. Ct. 1719.
211. See id. at 1723–24.
212. Id. at 1726.
213. Id. at 1726, 1728.
214. See id. at 1726.
215. Stephen M. Feldman, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too? Religious Freedom and LGBTQ
Rights, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 35, 36, 46 (2018) (noting that the Court sidestepped the conflict
between LGBTQ rights and religious liberties but that the tensions ultimately must be resolved).
216. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30.
217. Id. at 1730–31.
218. Id. at 1731–32.
219. Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New Minorities, 2018 SUP.
CT. REV. 257, 281.
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state protection.”220 The Court emphasizes “a broader climate of hostility and
disdain directed toward people of faith,”221 even as the opinion elides the long
history of discrimination against gays and lesbians that prompted Colorado to
protect them in the first place. For Murray, this shows “the malleability of
animus—and the antidiscrimination narrative more generally.”222
Formalism makes animus especially protean because it divorces protected
categories from histories of exclusion and ongoing inequities that make groups
particularly vulnerable to mistreatment.223 Take, for example, the Court’s recent
five-to-four decision in Bostock v. Clayton County,224 in which the majority
concluded, over vigorous dissent, that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
extends protection from workplace discrimination to gays, lesbians, and
transgender individuals.225 Both the majority and dissenting opinions focused
entirely on questions of textual interpretation, in particular, the meaning of the
term “sex” in the statute.226 In fact, Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority opinion and
Justice Alito’s dissent argued over which most faithfully adhered to textualism
while reaching opposite conclusions.227 For the majority, discrimination against
gays and lesbians necessarily turned entirely on the sex of their chosen partners,
while discrimination against gender nonconforming persons depended on a lack
of alignment between their biological and self-identified sex.228 Therefore, the
majority argued, Title VII covers these forms of discrimination, regardless of
whether they were uppermost in the minds of legislators.229 Justice Alito’s
dissent similarly focused on the term “sex” but contended that at the time
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, no one would have understood
it to apply to gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals.230 Moreover, in the
intervening years, Congress had declined to adopt nondiscrimination measures
protecting gays and lesbians, and the very notion of gender nonconformity was
not widely understood until years after Title VII’s passage.231

220. Id. at 282.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 285.
223. See Sunstein, supra note 9.
224. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
225. Id. at 1737.
226. See id. at 1738–44; id. at 1755–74 (Alito, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion also attached
dictionary excerpts in a lengthy set of appendices. Id. at 1784–91.
227. Id. at 1738 (majority opinion) (detailing the majority’s search for “ordinary public meaning”
of statutory language); id. at 1755–56 (Alito, J., dissenting) (giving the dissent’s accusation that the
majority “sails under a textualist flag” but “actually represents . . . a theory of statutory interpretation
that Justice Scalia excoriated”).
228. Id. at 1741–43 (majority opinion).
229. Id. at 1749–54.
230. Id. at 1766–73 (Alito, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 1767–73.

100 N.C. L. REV. 785 (2022)

820

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

Whatever the differences in these approaches to textual interpretation,
both Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion and Justice Alito’s dissent in Bostock
focused almost entirely on the language of the statute, its legislative history,
and its plain meaning to legislators.232 As a result, the opinions treated a history
of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender nonconformity as
largely irrelevant. The very invisibility of this history is a hallmark of
formalism, one that deprives the Court of any meaningful way to grapple with
animus and its role in antidiscrimination law. Demonstrating the doctrinal
malleability that Murray describes, the Court can narrowly conclude that civil
rights law protects gays and lesbians without ever engaging with questions of
bias and hostility. At the same time, the Justices can nullify efforts to punish
that very bias and hostility, again with little discussion of the dimensions of the
problem, by citing limited evidence of illicit animus against a religious baker.
In fact, the Court’s highly formalist approach to equality in Bostock, an opinion
devoid of context and values, prompted Professor Sunstein to predict
affirmative action’s imminent demise.233
2. The Danger of Missed Analogies
Equal protection law also can fall prey to problems of missed analogies,
another failing of formalism. Here, the incomplete conceptualization of animus
takes a different form. As law professor Jane Schacter explains, the emphasis on
formal categories can blind the Court to the varied histories of discrimination
that are predicates for stigmatization and subordination.234 For Schacter, a
formalist approach rests on “a conceptual foundation of sameness.”235 As a
result, civil rights becomes “a closed category” that is “constant in meaning,
impervious to change, and reducible to an irrefutable essence.”236 By “erasing
complexity and difference,” formalism ignores larger dynamics of disadvantage
by insisting that groups demanding protection meet a static definition of
harm.237 So, for example, because discrimination against gays and lesbians has
diverged from the historic experiences of racial minorities, courts are reluctant
to recognize sexual orientation as deserving of legal protection based on a
longstanding history of bias and hostility.238 In Schacter’s view, the Court’s
failure to engage with lived experiences of discrimination leads to missed
analogies—blind spots created by unduly rigid and reductionist understandings
of protected identity traits.
232. Id. at 1738–44 (majority opinion); id. at 1767–78, 1784–91 (Alito, J., dissenting).
233. Sunstein, supra note 9.
234. Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents,
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 285 (1994).
235. Id. at 296.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 297.
238. Id. at 298–300.
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The perils of missed analogies have been palpable in recent decisions
addressing whether religious beliefs can be a basis for discrimination based on
gender but not race. In Hobby Lobby, for instance, the Court found that the
company owners held sincere religious beliefs that justified a decision to deny
contraceptive coverage to female employees.239 To rebuff the dissent’s charge
that businesses had invoked similar arguments about religion to oppose racial
integration,240 the majority noted, in dictum and without elaboration, that “[t]he
Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to
participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial
discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”241 This
unadorned recitation of the strict scrutiny standard says nothing about the lived
experience of race nor why it differs so dramatically from gender.
Meanwhile, lower courts have been grappling with the distinction between
race-based and gender-based discrimination in cases involving vendors with
faith-based objections to same-sex marriage. These business owners seek to
deny wedding services to gay and lesbian couples, just as the baker in Masterpiece
Cakeshop did. In Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix,242 for example, the
Arizona Supreme Court held that Phoenix’s public accommodations ordinance
could not compel designers who prepared custom wedding invitations to
provide these services to same-sex couples.243 The majority found that the law
violated the First Amendment by requiring business owners to speak when they
would prefer to remain silent.244 In addition, the ordinance denied owners a
right to religious liberty under the state’s Free Exercise of Religion Act.245 In
response, the dissent argued that the majority had ignored precedent requiring
businesses to serve customers of all races, regardless of any faith-based
objections to integration.246 Those objections were also rooted in sectarian
convictions that civil rights laws “contravene[d] the will of God” and violated
business owners’ religious liberties.247 Because of this disregard for history, the
dissent concluded that the majority’s approach wrongly “diminishes our
defining statement that all are created equal.”248 The majority roundly rejected
239. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 720, 736 (2014).
240. Id. at 769–70 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 733 (majority opinion).
242. 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
243. Id. at 895.
244. Id. at 904, 926.
245. Id. at 917, 926.
246. Id. at 933–34 (Bales, J., dissenting).
247. Jim Shahin, A Barbecue Case that Helped the Cause of Civil Rights, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/a-barbecue-case-that-helped-the-cause-of-civil-rights
/2016/08/01/cc5edcd8-5203-11e6-b7de-dfe509430c39_story.html [https://perma.cc/G3G8-CXCM
(dark archive)] (describing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d
and remanded, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d as modified, 390 U.S. 400 (1968)).
248. Brush & Nib Studio, LC, 448 P.3d at 937.
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the dissent’s fears that the decision condoned racial discrimination, insisting
that earlier opinions interpreted civil rights statutes and did not implicate
concerns about free speech under the First Amendment.249 Because the
majority’s justification rested on parsing doctrinal authority, the dissent
dismissed the response as misguided “legal formalism,” which failed to account
fully for equality concerns.250
Court watchers anticipated that the Justices would offer further guidance
on whether religious liberty interests include a right to discriminate in Fulton v.
City of Philadelphia.251 Catholic Social Services (“CSS”), a licensed foster care
agency affiliated with the Catholic Church, was founded in 1917 at a time when
child placements were handled on a private basis.252 In the intervening years,
the city of Philadelphia took over the system and contracted with thirty
agencies, including CSS, to perform placement services.253 Under the contracts,
the city required agencies to refrain from discriminating on the basis of race,
color, national origin, religion, and sexual orientation.254 CSS refused to certify
same-sex, married couples as foster parents based on its religious conviction that
marriage must be between a man and a woman.255 The city therefore declined
to renew CSS’s contract, noting that despite “respect [for CSS’s] sincere
religious beliefs,” the “freedom to express them is not at issue here where you
have chosen voluntarily to partner with us in providing government-funded,
secular social services.”256
CSS challenged the termination, and the Supreme Court unanimously
concluded that the city’s action violated the Free Exercise Clause.257 Although
all the Justices reached the same conclusion, their reasoning diverged sharply.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts sidestepped the most
controversial constitutional issues, much as the majority did in Masterpiece
Cakeshop.258 To avoid addressing the conflict between religious liberties and
nondiscrimination mandates, the Court first concluded that CSS was not a
public accommodation under Pennsylvania law. According to the opinion,
249. Id. at 916.
250. Id. at 933–34 (Bales, J., dissenting).
251. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021); Andrew R. Lewis, The Fight for Religious Freedom Isn’t What It Used To
Be, ATLANTIC (June 17, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/06/fulton-andpolarization-religious-freedom/619158/ [https://perma.cc/R7EG-NT9A (dark archive)] (“The Fulton
decision is substantial, but it is not the blockbuster outcome that some had expected.”).
252. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
Foster parents who used CSS’s services joined CSS in the suit as plaintiffs. Id. at 150.
253. Id. at 147.
254. Id. at 148; 141 S. Ct. at 1875–76.
255. 922 F.3d at 148; 141 S. Ct. at 1875–76. CSS also refused to certify unmarried couples and
considered all same-sex couples to be unmarried. 922 F.3d at 148; 141 S. Ct. at 1875.
256. 922 F.3d at 150.
257. 141 S. Ct. at 1882.
258. See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text.
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foster care certifications involved services that are “not readily accessible to the
public” and instead required “customized and selective assessment that bears
little resemblance to staying in a hotel, eating at a restaurant, or riding a bus.”259
As a result, the Court focused only on the nondiscrimination provisions in
contracts between the city and foster care agencies like CSS.260
The Court next found that Philadelphia’s contractual arrangements with
CSS were subject to strict scrutiny because they were not neutral, nor were they
generally applicable.261 In particular, a provision allowed city officials to grant
exemptions from the nondiscrimination policy at their sole discretion.262 The
city had clearly indicated that it would not make an exception for CSS, despite
its claim of religious hardship.263 In applying strict scrutiny, the Court rejected
Philadelphia’s claim that its officials enjoyed broad managerial authority when
administering municipal contracts and were therefore entitled to judicial
deference.264 The Justices ultimately concluded that the proffered reasons for
terminating CSS’s contract did not satisfy a highly exacting standard of review.
The city identified three compelling interests to justify its action: (1)
maximizing the number of foster parents; (2) minimizing liability; and (3)
ensuring equal treatment of prospective foster families.265 Despite describing
the first two goals as “important,” the Court found no reason to believe that
granting an exemption to CSS would jeopardize those interests.266 Including
CSS in the foster care program appeared to increase the number of foster
parents, and the threat of litigation was speculative.267 The Court agreed that
the interest in equal treatment was “a weighty one” but determined that it did
not justify “denying CSS an exemption while making them available to others,”
particularly when CSS “does not seek to impose [its religious] beliefs on anyone
else.”268
Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Clarence Thomas concurred in
the judgment. In separate opinions, Justices Alito and Gorsuch chided the
Court for evading pressing constitutional questions about the scope of religious
liberties when they conflict with nondiscrimination provisions. Justice Alito
wrote that “[t]his decision might as well be written on the dissolving paper sold
in magic shops”269 because Philadelphia could easily amend its
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

141 S. Ct. at 1180.
Id. at 1881.
Id. at 1876–78, 1881.
Id. at 1878.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1881.
Id. at 1881–82.
Id. at 1882.
Id.
Id. at 1887 (Alito, J., concurring).
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nondiscrimination clause and terminate CSS’s contract again.270 Justice Gorsuch
echoed these concerns, noting that “[d]odging the question today guarantees it
will recur tomorrow” because “[t]hese cases will keep coming until the Court
musters the fortitude to supply an answer.”271 Justice Alito’s concurrence in the
judgment is especially instructive because he relied on a formalist interpretation
in according broad protection to religious liberties under the Free Exercise
Clause. In particular, he examined the clause’s text and general meaning at the
time of adoption to conclude that officials must refrain from interfering with
religious liberties unless their exercise poses a threat to public peace or safety.272
In other words, any law that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise,
whether or not it is neutral and generally applicable, should be subject to strict
scrutiny.273
Justice Alito recognized that this approach would permit religious beliefs
and practices to justify discriminatory conduct.274 In his view, however,
“[s]uppressing speech—or religious practice—simply because it expresses an
idea that some find hurtful is a zero-sum game.”275 In defending his position,
Justice Alito was quick to distinguish between discrimination based on sexual
orientation and on race, refusing even to consider the possibility of analogous
histories of marginalization and exclusion. He asserted that “[w]hile CSS’s ideas
about marriage are likely to be objectionable to same-sex couples, lumping those
who hold traditional beliefs about marriage together with racial bigots is
insulting to those who retain such beliefs.”276 To support that view, he noted
that in recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, the Court “refused to equate
traditional beliefs about marriage, which it termed ‘decent and honorable,’ with
racism, which is neither.”277 In short, Justice Alito continued to draw sharp
distinctions between gender-based and race-based discrimination, treating the
latter as sui generis and plainly impermissible—even in the face of religious
liberty claims.
The Fulton litigation makes clear that religious organizations continue to
demand increasing judicial deference and that this expanding deference is on a
collision course with nondiscrimination provisions. Although the treatment of
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). In fact, the Court has granted certiorari to hear another
case, this time involving a website designer’s challenge to a Colorado nondiscrimination law that
allegedly requires her to serve same-sex couples in violation of her religious beliefs. Adam Liptak,
Supreme Court To Hear Case of Web Designer Who Objects to Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
22, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/22/us/colorado-supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html
[https://perma.cc/Y24F-P2FQ (dark archive)].
272. 141 S. Ct. at 1894–907 (Alito, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 1924.
274. Id. at 1925.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015)).
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same-sex couples has garnered the lion’s share of attention, the impact on
protected groups is more sweeping. The Court has already allowed free exercise
claims to weigh against women’s access to contraception, for example.278 In
addition, there have been repeated concerns that some religious beliefs will be
at loggerheads with a norm of racial nondiscrimination.279 This ongoing struggle
for primacy between liberty and equality interests has immediate implications
for affirmative action, an area in which the Court has relied on institutional
autonomy to justify the consideration of race in admissions. Professor Sunstein
already has predicted that the Justices’ commitment to formalism will spell the
end for affirmative action in higher education. However, a careful examination
of false equivalencies and missed analogies under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments provides the necessary jurisprudential tools to determine whether
affirmative action can be saved and, if so, how. Fidelity to Bakke and its progeny
means that issues of institutional autonomy are as central to the analysis as
principles of nondiscrimination. In fact, it will be critical to preserve a
recognition of the unique mission of colleges and universities when determining
the appropriate level of deference to accord the use of race in admissions.
III. FORMALISM AND THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Court’s reliance on formalism, with its attendant dangers of false
equivalencies and missed analogies, presents new challenges for an affirmative
action jurisprudence rooted in Justice Powell’s pragmatic vision. A danger of
missed analogies arises because of the Court’s increasing willingness to intrude
on institutional autonomy in higher education, even as the Justices maintain a
hands-off approach to corporate speech rights and, more strikingly, enhance
protections for religious liberties. Although the Court has heightened demands
for proof that race-conscious admissions are necessary, it has shown no similar
appetite for second-guessing how corporations engage in speech once freed
from the strictures of campaign finance laws.280 Religious advocates have
actively supported a laissez-faire approach to corporate speech in order to
bolster autonomy rights that undergird many religious liberty cases.281 In
278. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 691, 705–09, 719 (2014).
279. See Kyle C. Velte, Recovering the Race Analogy in LGBTQ Religious Exemption Cases, 42
CARDOZO L. REV. 67, 97–98, 108–17, 136–39 (2020).
280. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014); Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754–55 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010).
281. See KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA
INVENTED CHRISTIAN AMERICA 7–8 (2015) (describing how Christian activism “helped reshape the
national debate about the proper functions of the federal government, the political influence of
corporations, and the role of religion in national life”); Kevin M. Kruse, How Corporate America Invented
Christian America, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/
corporate-america-invented-religious-right-conservative-roosevelt-princeton-117030/ [http://perma.cc
/7RUC-FF7X] (“In many ways, the marriage of corporate and Christian interests that has recently
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keeping with this muscular interpretation of First Amendment freedoms, the
Justices have declined to scrutinize faith-based activities of churches, nonprofit
religious organizations, and even for-profit closed corporations.282 That
deference has grown so great that the Court examines neither the sincerity of a
religious belief nor the reasonableness of a conclusion that a neutral and
generally applicable government requirement burdens that belief.283 Due to the
Court’s growing deference, religious liberty interests have trumped
nondiscrimination principles in areas ranging from employment to public
accommodations.284
The Court’s approach to colleges and universities looks very different, as
the Justices express growing skepticism in affirmative action cases. In Fisher I,
the Court criticized lower federal courts for applying a “good faith” test to
evaluate whether race-based admissions are necessary to promote a compelling
interest in diversity. The Justices acknowledged that courts had to defer to
academic judgments about mission and goals, but no such deference was due
when decisions involved programmatic implementation of these values and
objectives.285 As a result, the Court demanded persuasive evidence that the
university’s race-based admissions process was still essential to achieve a diverse
student body.286 On remand, the university produced studies that satisfied the
Court’s demand for proof, even as the dissent attacked the majority for
retreating from a promise of aggressive scrutiny of the admissions program.287
Nowhere has the Court explained why searching scrutiny of college and
university decision-making is appropriate even as the Justices have adopted a
far more hands-off approach when reviewing actions by other institutions,
especially religious organizations. Under the framework of First Amendment
institutionalism, the Court should defer to judgments that have a unique
relationship to academic expertise.288 At present, the Justices have done so only
when evaluating pedagogical objectives. Yet, crafting programmatic initiatives
arguably is as integral to educators’ know-how as choosing institutional values
and goals. Indeed, mission statements often are couched in lofty generalities,
while the real implications emerge in developing concrete policies and
programs.289 If so, courts at least should move to a medium version of First
dominated the news—from the Hobby Lobby case to controversies over state-level versions of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act—is not that new at all.”).
282. See supra Section II.B.1.
283. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 717–19, 723–24.
284. See supra notes 127–37, 168–76, 210–21, 239–49 and accompanying text.
285. Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 311–14 (2013); see also supra Section I.B.
286. See Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 311–14; Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208, 2211–12 (2016).
287. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214–15; id. at 2215–17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
288. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
289. See V. Kasturi Rangan, Lofty Missions, Down-to-Earth Plans, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.
2004), https://hbr.org/2004/03/lofty-missions-down-to-earth-plans [https://perma.cc/AZ8Q-NHGA]
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Amendment institutionalism, which defers to colleges’ and universities’ choices
about ends and means, so long as administrators follow well-developed internal
norms and procedures. This change would allow institutions of higher education
to adopt flexible approaches to enrolling a diverse student body, rather than
conform to the holistic approach Justice Powell endorsed in Bakke as a hopedfor, albeit highly imperfect, safe harbor from litigation.290
That move could avoid an unduly crimped understanding of deference in
higher education, a parsimony that has grown all the more evident as the Court’s
respect for the autonomy of other First Amendment institutions flourishes.
Absent any explanation for the differential treatment, the Court’s limited
regard for college and university decision-making sends a message that
institutions of higher education play, at most, a subsidiary role in nurturing
discourse in a democratic society. There is no basis for such a conclusion. On
the contrary, our public dialogue has grown increasingly polarized, information
has been weaponized, and distrust of experts has grown.291 Given these trends,
respect for the academic freedom of colleges and universities as an essential
bulwark of the nation’s democratic traditions should be strengthened rather
than diminished.292
If left unaddressed, a missed analogy—the failure to recognize and rectify
the declining status of institutional autonomy in higher education as compared
to other First Amendment institutions—could mean the end of affirmative
action in admissions. A negative message about the academic freedom of
colleges and universities entrenches distrust about higher education
administrators’ ability to make responsible judgments.293 These doubts could
undercut the prevailing view that admissions programs may properly use race
(arguing that successful nonprofit organizations must move from generalized missions to
operationalized plans and strategies to have successful programs).
290. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 71–72
(2017); Harry Bruinius, Who Made You an Expert? Is America’s Distrust of ‘Elites’ Becoming More Toxic?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2018/0827/
Who-made-you-an-expert-Is-America-s-distrust-of-elites-becoming-more-toxic [https://perma.cc/LT
7Z-8JT5 (dark archive)]; Michael Dimock, How Americans View Trust, Facts, and Democracy Today,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/trust/archive/winter-2020/howamericans-view-trust-facts-and-democracy-today [https://perma.cc/YZ58-6CLV].
292. See Judith Rodin & Stephen P. Steinberg, Incivility and Public Discourse, in PUBLIC
DISCOURSE IN AMERICA: CONVERSATION AND COMMUNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1,
13, 20–21 (Judith Rodin & Stephen P. Steinberg eds., 2011).
293. See Peter Kanelos, The Public Is Losing Confidence in Higher Ed—Here’s Why, HILL (Oct.
19, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/education/411924-the-public-is-losing-confidence-in-higher-edheres-why [https://perma.cc/J984-AW3H] (reporting a Gallup poll that showed that confidence in
higher education in the United States dropped below fifty percent for the first time); Scott Jaschik,
Falling Confidence in Higher Education, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2018/10/09/gallup-survey-finds-falling-confidence-higher-education [https://perma.cc/FH
A4-D8EW] (explaining that higher education saw the largest decline in confidence of any sector
between 2015 and 2018).
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to promote diversity in the student body.294 The Justices have steadfastly
endorsed a principle of colorblindness,295 and there is no reason to think that
they will retreat from this position. As a result, the role of academic freedom in
countering the Court’s hostility to racial classifications remains vital.
So far, every Supreme Court decision on affirmative action has used
institutional deference as an antidote to the false equivalencies inherent in
colorblindness. In Bakke, even as the Court dismantled U.C. Davis’s set-aside
program, it turned to another institution of higher education, Harvard
University, to identify a race-conscious admissions program that could
permissibly advance the goal of diversity.296 In Fisher II, the Justices ultimately
upheld the admissions program at the University of Texas after some saberrattling about the need for convincing proof that race-conscious policies and
practices were still necessary.297 Contemporary assaults on the legitimacy of
academic decision-making jeopardize these precedents, as the recent litigation
at Harvard and the University of North Carolina makes clear. Indeed, the
plaintiff in the Harvard case has attacked the bona fides of the very admissions
policy that Justice Powell held up as a model. The lawsuit characterizes the
Harvard plan not as a benign effort to enroll a diverse student body but as a
nefarious way to camouflage discrimination against Jews and Asian Americans,
who also belong to vulnerable minority groups.298 These allegations not only
deprecate Harvard’s trustworthiness, but they also reinforce the notion that all
racial classifications are corrosive and pernicious.
Ironically, though, even if the Court reaffirms or strengthens its regard for
colleges’ and universities’ autonomy, dangers remain based on other risks of
false equivalencies and missed analogies that currently plague
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. In recent religious liberty cases, courts have
created hierarchies of disadvantage that treat gender and race very differently.
According to these decisions, religious entities can discriminate based on
gender, for example, by refusing to provide contraceptive coverage or by
denying services to same-sex couples. However, racial discrimination is so
uniquely invidious that even religious beliefs cannot justify a departure from
public accommodations laws.299 The Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed this
294. Scott Jaschik, Positive View of Higher Ed, with Lots of Caveats, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 17,
2018), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/09/17/new-national-survey-finds-generally-positive
-views-higher-education-weak-points-well [https://perma.cc/JW9W-XVJM] (reporting on a poll that
generally found more favorable views of higher education than other polls but noted that seventy-two
percent disagreed with the use of race in admissions though sixty-four percent thought a diverse student
body was extremely or very important).
295. See supra notes 40–41, 52–53, 55 and accompanying text.
296. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 285, 316–18 (1978).
297. See 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2211–12, 2214–15 (2016).
298. See Harvard Complaint, supra note 68, at 3.
299. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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distinction. In Hobby Lobby, for instance, Justice Ginsburg raised the possibility
that for-profit corporations might discriminate based on race due to faith-based
objections to interracial marriage.300 Justice Alito summarily rejected her
concerns by citing the compelling interest in providing equal opportunity
without regard to race.301 Because of these precedents, renewed deference to
academic freedom might not be enough to save affirmative action. The
programs could still founder on recent statements that differential treatment
based on race, in contrast to other forms of discrimination, is utterly
intolerable.302 Given the Court’s longstanding commitment to colorblindness,
the Justices might create a false equivalency between a business’s use of race to
deny a customer service and a university’s use of race to promote racial
inclusion.303
For affirmative action to survive, then, advocates must find a way to
neutralize this peril. To that end, they should challenge the
compartmentalization that arises when the Court focuses on factual similarities
and ignores the underlying values at stake.304 In particular, the Justices must
acknowledge the full implications of the precedents set in Bob Jones and Bakke,
two decisions seldom mentioned in the same breath. Seven years after Justice
Powell found a way to permit affirmative action in higher education in Bakke,
the Court upheld the Internal Revenue Service’s refusal to grant tax-exempt
status to Bob Jones University, a nonprofit religious institution, because it had
denied students admission and expelled them based on their involvement in
interracial relationships.305 At no time did the Bob Jones decision cast any doubt
on the legitimacy of affirmative action under Bakke.306 On the contrary, even as
the Court concluded that Bob Jones’s practices violated an important public

300. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 769–70 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 733 (majority opinion).
302. See supra Section II.C.2 (describing how the courts have treated race-based discrimination as
uniquely pernicious even when based on religious beliefs).
303. This kind of false equivalency would flout distinctions that the Court itself made in the Bob
Jones University case. See supra notes 185–90 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 84–85, 155 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 185–90 and accompanying text.
306. If affirmative action had been impermissible racial discrimination, there could have been
challenges to the tax-exempt status that many colleges and universities enjoy. See ASS’N OF AM.
UNIVS., TAX EXEMPTION FOR UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 501(C)(3) AND SECTION 115, at 1–2 (Mar. 2014), http://aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU%
20Files/Key%20Issues/Taxation%20%26%20Finance/Tax-Exempt-Status-of-Universities-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma. cc/5CV2-CBQJ] (describing tax-exempt status of most American institutions of higher
education). In 2020, President Donald J. Trump threatened to revisit the tax-exempt status of
nonprofit colleges and universities because their curricula focused on “Radical Left Indoctrination, not
Education.” Paul Fain, Trump Threatens Tax Exemption of Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 13, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/07/13/trump-threatens-tax-exemption-colleges
[https://perma.cc/J5LX-X2RS].
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policy, the Justices consistently found that diversity in the student body is a
compelling interest.307
In short, the Court can and has distinguished between constructive and
destructive uses of race in higher education for nearly forty years. As a result,
dicta about racial discrimination in Hobby Lobby and other religious liberty cases
should not automatically determine the fate of race-conscious admissions in
higher education. After all, the denial of services based on religious objections
closely resembles the race-based enrollment policies at Bob Jones University.
Yet, the Court has never found that the decision in Bob Jones undercuts Bakke’s
recognition of the permissibility of some forms of affirmative action in
admissions. On the contrary, even with relatively modest deference to the
autonomy of colleges and universities, the Justices have repeatedly upheld both
the diversity rationale and the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting a
student body. So long as academic freedom remains a constitutionally protected
value, there is no reason to undo the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence
simply because the Justices appear to be strengthening the autonomy of
religious institutions to discriminate.
CONCLUSION
The unbearable emptiness of formalism resides in its incuriosity about
context in cases in which both facts and values matter greatly. In First
Amendment jurisprudence, this difficulty manifests itself in an indifference to
the speaker’s identity when the Court evaluates speech, association, and free
exercise rights. That indifference has led to missed analogies that obscure the
importance of First Amendment institutions, especially colleges and
universities, in advancing robust discourse. A proper understanding of their
unique role could enable the Court to better calibrate the appropriate level of
deference due to pedagogical decision-making. The Justices have accorded some
weight to academic freedom, but regard for this value has paled in comparison
to the respect accorded to other forms of institutional autonomy, most notably
the liberty interests of religious organizations. The missed analogy to other
First Amendment institutions has weakened the case for affirmative action in
admissions, which turns heavily on accepting academic judgments about the
learning environment.
In Fourteenth Amendment cases, the limits of formalism mainly manifest
themselves in false equivalencies. Because the Court emphasizes categorical
labels rather than histories of discrimination and persistent inequities, it has no
way to distinguish between benign and malign uses of race. In litigation over
college and university admissions, this lack of context has prompted the Court
to apply strict scrutiny to race-based admissions policies, even when they are
307. See supra notes 30, 37, 41, 47, 55, 189 and accompanying text.
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designed to promote inclusion of underrepresented groups. That formalistic
approach has a renewed potential to undo affirmative action because the Court
recently has treated race-based distinctions as uniquely pernicious in religious
liberty cases. Only by overcoming formalism’s tendency to treat all forms of
discrimination as equivalently insidious can advocates deflect this danger.
The perils of formalism for affirmative action jurisprudence have grown
in recent years. The deference to decision-making in higher education seems
increasingly crimped, and the characterization of race-based policies and
practices as singularly dangerous has intensified. To secure the future of
affirmative action, advocates must make the failures of formalism transparent
by demonstrating the ongoing importance of colleges and universities in
advancing an inclusive discourse that reflects the nation’s diversity and
advances its democratic ideals.
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